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ATKINS AFTERMATH:
IDENTIFYING MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDERS
AND EXCLUDING THEM FROM EXECUTION
Peggy M. Tobolowsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, in Penry v. Lynaugh,' a five-Justice majority of the United States Supreme
Court (the "Court") held that the execution of mentally retarded offenders was not cate-
gorically barred by the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition.2
In 2002, however, a six-member majority reached the opposite conclusion regarding this
issue.3 In Atkins v. Virginia,4 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does categori-
cally bar the execution of mentally retarded offenders. Although many of the factual and
legal arguments presented in these cases were identical, a key distinguishing factor was
the number of states that had enacted legislative bans on the execution of mentally re-
tarded offenders in the period following the Penry decision. This legislative activity
supported the Court's conclusion in Atkins that the death penalty is no longer a constitu-
tionally permissible punishment for mentally retarded offenders.5
In this connection, at the time of the Penry decision, only Congress and two states
had adopted categorical prohibitions of the execution of mentally retarded offenders.6
* Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of North Texas; J.D., 1977, George Washington
University; B.A., 1974, Washington University.
I. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
2. Id. at 330-35; id. at 351 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see, e.g., EMILY
FABRYCKI REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
RETARDATION (1993); Peter K.M. Chan, Note, Eighth Amendment-The Death Penalty and the Mentally
Retarded Criminal: Fairness, Culpability, and Death, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1211 (1990); Virginia
G. Wilson, Note, Penry v. Lynaugh: Mentally Retarded Defendants and the Death Penalty, 34 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 345 (1990). See generally Susan M. Boland, Walking the Edge of Death: An Annotated Bibliography on
Juveniles, the Mentally Ill, the Mentally Retarded and the Death Penalty, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 131, 219-39
(2001).
3. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
4. Id.; see, e.g., Mitchel A. Brim, The Ultimate Solution to Properly Administer the Ultimate Penalty, 32
Sw. U. L. REV. 275 (2003); Carol S. Steiker, Commentary, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The
Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475 (2002); John F. Romano, Note, Kinder, Gen-
tler, and More Capricious: The Death Penalty after Atkins v. Virginia, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 123 (2003); Eli
Velasquez, Note and Comment, The Shaping of an American Consensus Against the Execution of Mentally
Retarded Criminals: A Case Note on Atkins v. Virginia, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 955 (2003).
5. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21; id. at 339-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting), with Penry, 492 U.S. at
328-40; id. at 342-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 350 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 351 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002). The current version of all statutes is used in this Article unless otherwise noted.
Due to the recency of the enactment of the post-Atkins legislation, electronic source material and session law
materials are utilized regarding this legislation, as needed. See, e.g., infra note 9.
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By the time of the Atkins decision, sixteen additional states had enacted legislative bans
and implementing procedures. 7 In Atkins, the Court entrusted to the states the task of
adopting appropriate mechanisms to implement the constitutional prohibition of the
execution of mentally retarded offenders.8 Since Atkins, ten of the remaining twenty
capital punishment states have legislatively or judicially adopted procedures to imple-
ment the categorical exclusion from execution.
9
The ultimate scope of the Court's holding in Atkins will be affected by the manner
in which states define mental retardation for purposes of the constitutional exclusion,
identify the appropriate fact finder regarding and timing of the mental retardation deter-
mination, assign the burden of proof and standard of proof concerning mental retarda-
tion, and identify post-conviction review opportunities. After reviewing the Penry and
Atkins decisions, this Article examines the procedures adopted by the states before and
after Atkins to identify mentally retarded offenders and exclude them from execution. It
also analyzes the legal principles governing and practical considerations influencing the
adoption of these procedures, before recommending procedures which best comport
with the spirit of the Atkins holding. The Article also addresses other implementation
issues resulting from the recognition of the constitutional ban.
II. FROM PENRYTOATKINS: IDENTIFYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTION
A. Penry-No Constitutional Bar to the Execution of Mentally Retarded Qffenders
In Penry, the Court addressed the case of a mentally retarded offender who was
twenty-two at the time of the crime, but whose ability to learn and knowledge ("mental
age") were consistent with that of a six-and-a-half year-old and whose ability to function
in the world ("social maturity") was that of a nine or ten year-old. Penry's intelligence
quotient ("IQ") scores over the years ranged between fifty and sixty-three.' 0 Neverthe-
less, Penry was found competent to stand trial and the jury rejected his insanity defense,
7. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-1101 to -1105 (West Pamp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a
(2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie 1998);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, .135, .140 (Michie 1999); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003 Cur. Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-26.1 to .7 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-203 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2002); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596 (West 2000).
8. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
9. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 4209 (Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS through
2003 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a-101 to -106, 77-18a-I (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3: 1.1 to :1.2 (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess.); Act of Nov. 19,
2003, 2003 111. SB 472 (to be codified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15, 5/122-2.2); Act of June 27, 2003,
2003 La. Act 698, 2003 La. HB 1017 (to be codified at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1); Act of May
21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015,
177.055, 200.030); Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172 (Miss. 2003); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio 2002);
Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). The Louisiana Supreme Court developed an interim
procedure before the legislature acted. See State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835 (La. 2002).
10. This evidence was introduced at Penry's pretrial competency hearing. Pen ry, 492 U.S. at 307-08. At
trial, Penry introduced psychiatric testimony that he suffered from organic brain damage and "moderate retar-
dation" and testimony from his mother about his inability to learn in school. Government psychiatrists agreed
that Penry had "extremely limited mental ability," but disagreed about the extent and causes of his mental




convicted him of capital murder, and answered punishment questions regarding his de-
liberation, response to provocation, and continuing threat to society which resulted in a
death sentence under Texas procedure." At his trial, on direct appeal, and in his federal
collateral review proceedings, Penry unsuccessfully raised the claim that execution of a
mentally retarded offender like himself was prohibited under the Eighth Amendment.'
2
The Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of a person with the "reasoning capacity of a seven year old.'
13
Because Penry's claim reached the Court through the collateral review process, the
Court initially had to determine whether Penry's claim sought a "new rule,"'14 the an-
nouncement and application of which the Court had significantly restricted in collateral
review cases in Teague v. Lane.'5 The Court determined that the holding Penry sought
would indeed require the establishment of a "new rule," not dictated by precedent at the
time Penry's conviction became final and imposing a new obligation on the states and
federal government.' 6 However, the Court unanimously determined that Penry's claim
could be considered and applied retroactively to defendants on collateral review because
it satisfied one of the exceptions the Court had established to the nonretroactivity doc-
trine in Teague.'7
On the merits of Penry's claim, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Kennedy, and Scalia, noted that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
punishments considered "cruel and unusual" as of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, as
well as those currently so considered under the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society" concept utilized by the Court in its Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.' 8 In determining such evolving standards, the Court had previously
considered objective evidence-the "clearest and most reliable" of which was the legis-
lation enacted by American legislatures, as well as data regarding the action of sentenc-
ing juries.' 9
Although the Court concluded that "idiots" and "lunatics" were not subject to pun-
ishment for their criminal acts at common law, it determined that neither of these terms
encompassed mentally retarded offenders comparable to Penry. The term "idiot" referred
I1. Id. at 308-11.
12. Id. at 310-13; see Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 918 (5th Cir. 1987); Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d
636, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
13. Pent-i, 492 U.S. at 345 n.l (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see id. at 313; id. at
336 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). The Court also granted certiorari to determine whether Penry had been uncon-
stitutionally sentenced to death because the trial court's instructions did not adequately allow the sentencing
jury to consider and give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence, including that concerning mental retardation.
See id. at 310-13.
14. Id. at 329-30.
15. 489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989) (plurality opinion).
16. Penrv,492 U.S. at 329.
17. In Penry, the Court gave majority status to the nonretroactivity principles established in the plurality
opinion in Teague and extended them to capital cases. See id. at 313-14; id. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The Court also interpreted the Teague exception to nonretroactivity concerning
new rules that place conduct beyond the government's power to punish to also include new rules that prohibit a
'certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." Id. at 330. Penry's
claim which, if successful, would categorically preclude execution of mentally retarded offenders such as
himself would thus qualify under this exception to the Teague nonretroactivity rule. Id. at 329-30: id. at 341-
42 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 350-51 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. Id. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); see id. at 351
(Scalia. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. Id. at 331.
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to individuals manifesting, from birth, a total absence of reason or understanding, or an
inability to distinguish between good and evil. The term "lunatic" referred to persons
with a "partial derangement" of intellectual capabilities with a restoration of capabilities
at "uncertain" intervals. 20 In contemporary practice, the circumstances of such persons
were addressed through the requirement of criminal competency and the availability of
the insanity defense, as well as the previously recognized constitutional prohibition of
the execution of insane offenders. 2' Moreover, these common law terms would only
arguably apply to a person within the "severe" or "profound" contemporary categories of
mental retardation, rather than the "mild" or "moderate" categories.22 Given Penry's less
extreme level of mental retardation, the finding as to his criminal competency, and the
jury's rejection of his insanity defense, he (and presumably other offenders like him)
would not fall within the common law prohibition of criminal punishment for "idiots"
and "lunatics."
2 3
The Court next assessed the proffered "objective" evidence of an emerging national
consensus against the execution of mentally retarded offenders reflective of the evolving
standards of American society. The Court found that the statutory prohibition of the
execution of mentally retarded offenders enacted by Congress and two states, 24 even
when added to the fourteen states which prohibited capital punishment entirely, fell
short of the evidence of national consensus in support of the categorical exclusions from
execution previously addressed regarding insane offenders and offenders younger than
sixteen at the time of the crime. Penry offered no evidence as to relevant responses of
sentencing juries and prosecutors regarding the execution of mentally retarded offend-
ers. The Court found the proffered results of public opinion polls and resolutions of
professional organizations insufficient evidence of a national consensus. Thus, although
mental retardation was clearly a factor that could reduce or mitigate an offender's culpa-
bility for a capital offense, the Court was unable to conclude that a national consensus
against the execution of mentally retarded offenders had been established which would
warrant the requested categorical exclusion from capital punishment.
26
In a portion of the opinion reflecting only her views, Justice O'Connor also evalu-
ated Penry's claim under the proportionality and punishment purpose standards utilized
by the Court in previous cases considering categorical exclusions from the death pen-
alty. 27 On the evidence presented, however, she was unable to conclude that mentally
20. Id. at 331-32.
21. Id. at 332-33; see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (prohibiting the execution of insane
offenders).
22. Penry, 492 U.S. at 332-33; see id. at 308 n.1 (referring to the classifications of mental retardation
established by the American Association on Mental Deficiency (now Retardation) based on IQ scores: "mild"
(between fifty to fifty-five and approximately seventy), "moderate" (between thirty-five to forty and fifty to
fifty-five), "severe" (between twenty to twenty-five and thirty-five to forty), and "profound" (below twenty or
twenty-five) in AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (8th ed.
1983)).
23. Id. at 333. But see Eric L. Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: Idiocy"and the Framers'Intent
Doctrine, 16 N. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315 (1990) (contending that Penry would have been
considered an "idiot" based on relevant authorities).
24. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002).
25. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334; see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826-33 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(addressing young offenders); Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-10 (addressing insane offenders).
26. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35; see id. at 340 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
27. Id. at 335-36 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); see, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150-58 (1987);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-801 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-87 (1976) (joint
[Vol. 30:1
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retarded offenders comparable to Penry, as a class, and without individualized consid-
eration of their particular circumstances, lacked sufficient culpability to make a death
sentence a proportionate punishment or to serve the punishment goal of retribution.28
Although they agreed with the conceptual framework of Justice O'Connor's propor-
tionality and punishment purpose analysis, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens disagreed with the result of her analysis. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, concluded that all offenders clinically defined as mentally retarded had insuf-
ficient intelligence and adaptive behavioral skills to provide a level of culpability pro-
portionate to a death sentence or to further the punishment goals of retribution or deter-
rence. They further concluded that the individualized sentencing mechanisms designed
to consider mitigating evidence during capital punishment proceedings were inadequate
to prevent mentally retarded offenders with limited culpability from nevertheless being
sentenced to death.29 Although he agreed with Justice O'Connor's presentation of the
competing arguments, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, concluded that exe-
cution of mentally retarded offenders was unconstitutional.3 °
B. Atkins-The Execution of Mentally Retarded Offenders Is
Constitutionally Prohibited
The Court revisited its Penry holding thirteen years later in Atkins v. Virginia.31 At-
kins involved a murder committed by an offender who, according to defense evidence,
had an IQ of fifty-nine, a "mental age" between nine and twelve, and a limited capacity
for adaptive behavior-all of which placed him in the "mild" range of mental retarda-
tion.32 The government presented evidence that Atkins had at least "average intelli-
gence."3 3 In conducting its proportionality review of Atkins' death sentence, a divided
Virginia Supreme Court determined that the conflicting evidence of mental retardation
did not render the defendant's death sentence excessive or disproportionate to sentences
for comparable capital murders in the state.34 The Court granted Atkins' certiorari peti-
tion on the question regarding "[w]hether the execution of mentally retarded individuals
convicted of capital crimes violates the Eighth Amendment. 3 5
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The other members of the Penry majority regarding this issue
expressly rejected Justice O'Connor's proportionality and punishment purpose analysis and concluded that this
analysis had "no place" in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Penry, 492 U.S. at 335-40 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Because of its imprecision and other inherent
limitations, Justice O'Connor also rejected the notion of establishing a categorical exclusion from the death
penalty based on the concept of "mental age." Id. at 339-40 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
29. Id. at 343-49 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id. at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Despite their disagreement with
Justice O'Connor regarding the categorical exception issue, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens agreed with her separate conclusion that the Texas procedure, as applied, provided an inadequate vehicle
for capital juries to consider and give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence of mental retardation and abused
background. Together, they formed a majority to reverse his death sentence on this basis. See id. at 319-28; id.
at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). But see id. at 352-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
32. Id. at 307-09; Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318-21 (Va. 2000), rev 'd sub nor. Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); id. at 321-24 (Hassell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309;Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 319.
34. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 32 1. But see id. at 324 (Hassell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 324-35 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
35. Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 809 (2001). Prior to accepting Atkins' case for review, the Court granted
20031
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Most of the legal issues raised in Atkins were similar to those presented in Penry.
Arguments in support of a ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders focused
on the impact of the limited intellectual and behavioral functioning of mentally retarded
offenders as a class. For example, concerns were raised that an offender's mental retar-
dation decreased the reliability of the outcome in the proceedings and increased the risk
of error to a level unacceptable in a capital case. It was argued that the available consid-
eration of mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance in capital sentencing had
proven an inadequate vehicle for the consideration of this condition. Finally, the conten-
tion was expressed that mental retardation limited these offenders' culpability to a de-
gree that rendered the death penalty a disproportionate and excessive punishment that
served no valid penological purpose. 36 Arguments in opposition to the ban expressed
support for the current consideration of mental retardation through criminal competency
and criminal insanity proceedings as well as through individualized capital sentencing in
which the issue of mental retardation was already considered as a mitigating circum-
stance. In addition, concerns were raised about the unnecessary interference and disrup-
tion that a constitutional ban would have on states' administration of the death penalty.37
The most critical difference between the Penry and Atkins arguments concerned the
significance attributed to the dramatic increase in the number of states that had enacted
bans on the execution of mentally retarded offenders in the intervening years. The par-
ties vigorously debated whether the prohibitions by the federal government and now
eighteen states-in addition to the twelve states which totally prohibited capital punish-
ment-represented the "national consensus" against the execution of mentally retarded
offenders deemed lacking in Penry. The resolution of this debate, in turn, would inform
the Court's determination whether the execution of mentally retarded offenders was
constitutionally prohibited as cruel and unusual punishment under the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" concept embodied in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.38
Two members of the five-member Penry majority (Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy) joined Penry dissenting Justice Stevens and three Justices who had joined the
Court after Penry to form a six-member majority that resolved the Penry issue with a
different result in Atkins. In an opinion utilizing a decisional framework reminiscent of
several categorical exception capital cases in which he had participated, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concluded that the
Eighth Amendment does constitutionally prohibit capital punishment for mentally re-
tarded offenders.39
a petition for a writ of certiorari on this issue from a North Carolina offender. When the North Carolina legis-
lature subsequently enacted its ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the Court dismissed the
petition as moot. On the same day as this dismissal, the Court granted Atkins' certiorari petition. See Atkins v.
Virginia, 533 U.S. 976 (2001); McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001); McCarver v. North Caro-
lina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001).
36. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-21. National legal, professional, and religious, and international groups
filed amicus curiae briefs supporting a constitutional ban. See id. at 316 n.2 I.
37. See id. at 348-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Supporting briefs were filed by a group of capital punishment
states without categorical bans on the execution of mentally retarded offenders and a public interest group. See
Briefs of Amici Curiae of the States of Alabama, Mississippi, et a]. and of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation,
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No.00-8452).
38. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16, with id. at 341-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 306-21; cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826-38 (1988) (plurality opinion); Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-10 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-801 (1982); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-600 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-87 (1976)
(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.).
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At the outset, the Court reaffirmed its interpretation, articulated in prior cases, that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits "all excessive punishments, as well as cruel and un-
usual punishments that may or may not be excessive" and requires that punishments be
"graduated and proportioned" to the offense.4 ° Moreover, the determination of the exces-
sive nature of a punishment is judged under the "evolving standards of decency" which
currently prevail rather than those prevalent at common law or the adoption of the Bill
of Rights. Although proportionality review under these evolving standards is informed
by "objective" factors, the "clearest and most reliable" of which is enacted legislation,
such objective evidence does not "wholly determine" the constitutional analysis.4'
Rather, the "Constitution contemplates that in the end [the Court's] own judgment will
be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment. 4 2 The Court, therefore, began its Atkins analysis with a review of
the legislative treatment of the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders before con-
sidering whether there were reasons to agree or disagree with the "judgment reached by
the citizenry and its legislators.,
43
In reviewing the legislative changes during the years since the Penry decision, the
Court noted not only the number of states that had enacted bans on the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, but also the "consistency of the direction" of the legislative
changes and the high levels of support for the enactment of the individual statutory pro-
hibitions. Even among capital punishment states without legislative bans, only five such
states had executed offenders with known IQs in the mentally retarded range since the
Penry decision. The Court thus concluded that the practice of executing mentally re-
tarded offenders had become "truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consen-
sus has developed against it."44 The Court further noted that additional evidence, sup-
plied by national professional and religious organizations, polling data, and international
authorities, "makes it clear that this legislative judgment [to bar the execution of men-
tally retarded offenders] reflects a much broader social and professional consensus."
45
The Court determined that the national consensus it had found against the execution
of mentally retarded offenders reflected a judgment about the relative culpability of
these offenders and the relationship between mental retardation and the punishment
purposes served by the death penalty. It also reflected a concern about the potential for
the characteristics of mental retardation to undermine the strength of procedural protec-
tions required in capital cases. In this connection, although many of the limitations asso-
ciated with mental retardation would not by themselves warrant a total exemption from
criminal responsibility and punishment, the Court concluded that the impairments inher-
ent in mental retardation nevertheless had the effect of diminishing the personal culpa-
bility of all mentally retarded offenders. In turn, this reduced personal culpability ren-
dered mentally retarded offenders inappropriate subjects to serve the retributive punish-
ment goals of capital punishment. In addition, the cognitive and behavioral impairments
associated with mental retardation prevented the execution of such offenders from sig-
nificantly serving the capital punishment goal of deterrence. Finally, these same im-
40. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 & n.7 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 311-12 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion)).
43. Id. at 313.
44. Id. at 316; see id. at 313-16.
45. Id. at 316 n.21.
2003]
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pairments tended to limit the effectiveness of mentally retarded offenders' defenses
against the imposition of the death penalty and to increase the risk of wrongful execu-
tion.46
Thus, the Court's independent evaluation revealed no reason to disagree with the
post-Penry legislative judgment that the death penalty is not a "suitable" punishment for
mentally retarded offenders. The Court therefore concluded that the execution of men-
tally retarded offenders is a constitutionally "excessive" punishment barred by the
Eighth Amendment. 47 As it had done previously regarding the prohibition of the execu-
tion of insane offenders, the Court entrusted to the states the responsibility to develop
mechanisms to identify mentally retarded capital offenders and to enforce the constitu-
48tional ban on their execution.
In two dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
attacked the jurisprudential and factual bases for the majority's holding. In these Jus-
tices' view, the determination that a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment is limited to methods and acts of punishment consid-
ered cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights and those modes
of punishment inconsistent with modem standards of decency. The determination of
contemporary standards should be limited to objective criteria, the sole indicators of
which should be the "work product of [American] legislatures and sentencing jury de-
terminations" and with primary weight given to enacted legislation. The dissenting Jus-
tices expressly rejected the majority's interpretation that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its "excessive" punishments as well as cruel and unusual ones.49
Using this analysis, the dissenting Justices concluded that execution of "mildly"
mentally retarded offenders, such as Atkins, was not considered cruel and unusual at
common law. The dissenters then rejected the majority's determination that a national
consensus in opposition to the execution of mentally retarded offenders had emerged
since Penry under the "evolving standards" concept. Basing their determination on the
actions of the capital punishment states only, the dissenters concluded that only a minor-
ity of these states had adopted bans against these executions and that the recency of the
enactments did not establish a settled state of the law. The dissenting Justices rejected,
as irrelevant or insignificant measures of contemporary standards, the majority's reliance
on the consistency in the direction of post-Penry legislative changes, the significant
margins by which such legislation had been enacted, and the infrequency with which
mentally retarded offenders had been executed in recent years. The dissenting Justices
also noted the absence of evidence of the conduct of sentencing juries in support of the
majority's finding of a national consensus in this case. These Justices especially criti-
cized and rejected the majority's inclusion of the views of professional and religious
organizations, international authorities, and public opinion polls in support of its finding
of national consensus against the execution of mentally retarded offenders.50
46. Id. at 317-21.
47. Id. at 321; cf Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989) (holding that execution of mentally re-
tarded offenders violates Georgia constitution); Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that
execution of mentally retarded offenders violates Tennessee constitution).
48. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (citing Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)).
49. Id. at 321-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 339-40, 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 321-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 339-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In addition to rejecting the constitutional relevance of the majority's "excessive"
punishment determination, the dissenting Justices also rejected the majority's factual
conclusions that the execution of mentally retarded offenders could never serve the pun-
ishment goals of retribution and deterrence and that juries could not adequately consider
mental retardation in their capital sentencing decisions. Finally, the dissenting Justices
criticized the Court's "death-is-different" capital punishment jurisprudence generally,
and the "arrogance" of the majority's usurpation of legislative and juror prerogatives by
its imposition of the ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders under "consti-
tutional pretext."5'
C. Atkins Aftermath-Implementing the Constitutional Mandate
Despite the seemingly wide sweep of the Court's Atkins holding constitutionally
barring the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the Court's opinion left many is-
sues regarding the implementation of the constitutional ban unresolved or unaddressed.
Rather than dictating the definitional and procedural attributes of the death penalty ex-
clusion, the Court entrusted this responsibility to the states utilizing capital punishment:
"As was our approach in Ford v. Wainright, with regard to insanity, 'we leave to the
States [sic] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restric-
tion upon its execution of sentences.' 52 The manner in which capital punishment states
define mental retardation for purposes of the exclusion from the death penalty will obvi-
ously have the greatest impact on the actual scope of the Court's holding. States' deter-
mination of key procedural aspects of the ban's implementation will also affect the ulti-
mate scope of the ruling: identification of the fact finder regarding mental retardation
(i.e., the court, the jury, or both), determination of the timing of the mental retardation
finding (e.g., prior to trial, after the guilt determination, or both), and the assignment of
the burden of proof and standard of proof. Finally, the manner in which post-conviction
review opportunities are provided will determine the impact of the holding on offenders
sentenced to death before Atkins. Other implementation issues concerning the pre-Atkins
state bans have already arisen and will continue to emerge (e.g., appellate review of
mental retardation findings and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
investigation or presentation of evidence regarding an offender's mental retardation).
The manner in which all of these issues are addressed will ultimately determine the
scope of the Court's prohibition of the execution of mentally retarded offenders in At-
kins.
Although the Court did not prescribe accompanying definitional and procedural
provisions in Atkins, jurisdictions are not totally without guidance in these matters.
States adopting bans after Atkins can learn from the experience of the federal criminal
justice system and states with pre-Atkins bans. Jurisdictions can utilize the guidance that
was provided in the Atkins opinion, as well as other Court rulings, regarding constitu-
tionally adequate definitional and procedural provisions. Importantly, because of the
Atkins constitutional prohibition of the execution of mentally retarded offenders, all
capital punishment jurisdictions-those with and without pre-Atkins bans-must ensure
that their procedures to identify mentally retarded offenders and exclude them from
5 1. Id. at 348-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17 (plurality opinion)).
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execution are adequate to implement the constitutional ban. This Article will recom-
mend procedures that should satisfy this standard.
III. MENTAL RETARDATION FOR PURPOSES OF THE ATKINS BAN
It is estimated that 1% to 3% of the general population is mentally retarded." Esti-
mates of the proportion of this country's incarcerated offenders who are mentally re-
tarded range from 2% to 25%. 54 Of the approximately 3,500 offenders currently on
"death rows" in America,55 estimates of the proportion who are mentally retarded range
between 4% and 20%,56 or approximately 140 to 700 offenders. Of the approximately
860 executions since the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976,57 estimates of the
number of mentally retarded offenders who have been executed range between 18 and
44.58 As these ranges indicate, the manner in which mental retardation is defined and in
which mentally retarded offenders are identified can have a substantial impact on the
scope of the Atkins holding and its implementation.
In fact, the Court in Atkins recognized the importance of the definitional component
of its ruling:
To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally re-
tarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. In this case,
for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins suffers from mental
retardation. Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as
to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national
59
consensus.
Therefore, the most important task for capital punishment jurisdictions in implementing
Atkins is to define the "mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national con-
sensus."60 Fortunately, this is the area about which the Court provided the greatest
53. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION,
AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 26, 52, 58 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter AAMR, 10th ed.]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 46 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinaf-
ter APA, DSM-IV-TRI; Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation, Fact Sheet: The Death Penalty, at
http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq-death-penalty.shtml (last visited July 5, 2003).
54. See REED, supra note 2, at 39; Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital
Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 59, 63 (1996); Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation, supra note 53; Leigh Ann Davis, People with
Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, at http://www.thearc.org/faqs/crimqa.html (last visited
July 5, 2003).
55. See Death Penalty Information Center, Death Row Inmates by State, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did=188 (last modified as of July 1, 2003) (indicating
3,517 death row inmates).
56. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 n.* (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); REED, supra note 2, at 39; Lyn Entze-
roth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National
Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 911 (2001); Timo-
thy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and the Mentally Retarded Defendant
After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 327 (2002); Steiker, supra note 4, at 1478 n. 10.
57. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=186 (last modified July 2, 2003) (indicating 861
executions since 1976).
58. See Entzeroth, supra note 56, at 911; Hall, supra note 56, at 328; Steiker, supra note 4, at 1478 n.10;
Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation, supra note 53.




amount of guidance in Atkins (and Penry) and about which there is a great deal of gen-
eral consensus among the jurisdictions which have adopted bans on the execution of
mentally retarded offenders before and after Atkins.
A. Court Guidance Regarding the Definition of Mental Retardation
Although its conclusions in Penry and Atkins regarding the constitutional prohibi-
tion of the execution of mentally retarded offenders were different, in each case, the
Court provided a definitional framework for the category of offenders it was addressing.
In both cases, the Court significantly relied on the definitional structure concerning
mental retardation developed by the American Association on Mental Retardation
("AAMR"), which the Penry Court characterized as the "country's oldest and largest
organization of professionals working with the mentally retarded." 6' In Atkins, the Court
also referred to the similar classification structure developed by the American Psychiat-
ric Association ("APA"). These references in Penry and Atkins not only provide guid-
ance to the states regarding the Court's understanding of the category of offenders cov-
ered by its rulings, but also the source material for its understanding.
Although the Penry Court members divided five-to-four in declining to recognize a
constitutional exclusion from capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders, the
Justices unanimously adopted the portion of the majority opinion in which they defined
mental retardation by reference to the AAMR classification text:
Persons who are mentally retarded are described as having "significantly subaver-
age general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive be-
havior and manifested during the developmental period." To be classified as mentally
retarded, a person generally must have an IQ of 70 or below. Under the AAMR clas-
sification system, individuals with IQ scores between 50-55 and 70 have "mild" retar-
dation. Individuals with scores between 35-40 and 50-55 have "moderate" retardation.
"Severely" retarded people have IQ scores between 20-25 and 35-40, and "pro-
foundly" retarded people have scores below 20 or 25.62
In addition, several references were made in the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's
separate portion of the opinion, and the dissenting opinions to the AAMR's definition of
mental retardation and to the arguments made and positions taken in the AAMR amicus
curiae brief submitted to the Court in the case.63 In fact, Justice Stevens' dissent, joined
by Justice Blackmun, on the merits of the exclusion issue was virtually limited to the
statement: "In my judgment .... that explication-particularly the summary of the ar-
guments advanced in the Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation et al. as
Amici Curiae---compels the conclusion that such executions are unconstitutional. "64
61. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
62. Id. at 308 n. I (quoting AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, supra note 22, at I, II, 13).
63. See id. at 333, 335; id. at 336, 337, 338, 339 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 344-46, 348-49 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
64. Id. at 350 (citation omitted).
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The Court again relied on the AAMR's definition of mental retardation in Atkins. In
explaining defense evidence that Atkins was "mildly mentally retarded, '65 the Court
provided the AAMR's definition of mental retardation, which had been further refined
since the Penry decision. Although this definition had eliminated the classification sys-
tem based on IQ score, the Court also provided the similar mental retardation definition
adopted by the APA, which still retained the IQ score classifications:
The American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retarda-
tion as follows: "Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present func-
tioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, exist-
ing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable
adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community
use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental
retardation manifests before age 18."
The American Psychiatric Association's definition is similar: "The essential feature
of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
(Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in
at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, so-
cial/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional aca-
demic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur be-
fore age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and
may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect
the functioning of the central nervous system." "Mild" mental retardation is typically
used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70.66
Later in the majority opinion, the Court summarized these definitions of mental retarda-
tion: "clinical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual
functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication,
self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18. ,67 Significantly, after
noting that not all offenders with mental retardation claims will fall "within the range of
mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus," which consensus
the Court had found based largely on the action of state-enacted bans, the Court further
noted that the states' "statutory definitions of mental retardation are not identical, but
generally conform to the clinical definitions set forth in [the quoted definitional material
above]." 68 Finally, the Court noted that an IQ "between 70 and 75 or lower" is "typically
considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retarda-
tion definition.,
69
Thus, in both Penry and Atkins, the Court made its constitutional rulings regarding
mentally retarded offenders with express reference to the clinical definition of mental
65. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308.
66. Id. at 308 n.3 (quoting AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992); APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 41, 42-
43); see infra note 73.
67. Id. at 318.
68. Id. at 317 & n.22.




retardation provided by the AAMR (and the parallel definition of the APA in Atkins).7"
Mentally retarded offenders who meet this definition certainly appear to be the mentally
retarded offenders about whom the Court has determined there is a national consensus.
States therefore should ensure that the definitional provisions in their capital punishment
exclusion provisions are at least as comprehensive as the clinical definitions referenced
by the Court in Penry and Atkins.
B. State Definitions of Mental Retardation
In fact, most states that have enacted bans on the execution of mentally retarded of-
fenders before and after Atkins have followed the Court's lead and have incorporated the
above clinical definitions into their legislative definitions of mental retardation. In this
connection, most states utilize all three prongs of the clinical definition concerning
subaverage intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifestation
before age eighteen. 71 The states vary somewhat, however, in the degree to which these
three elements are further defined in their statutory provisions.
1. Pre-Atkins Definitions
As the Atkins Court noted, states enacted bans on the execution of mentally retarded
offenders at a steady pace following the Penry decision, with legislative activity escalat-
ing in the period leading up to the Atkins decision.72 As the eighteen pre-Atkins states
enacted legislation, they often utilized the clinical definition in the current AAMR (or
APA) classification text,7 3 resulting in some variation in the characterization of the three
prongs of the mental retardation definition.74
70. Cf Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1993) (referring to the AAMR and APA definitional materi-
als in discussing the nature of mental retardation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 442 n.9 (1985) (referring to the AAMR definition of mental retardation).
71. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
72. See id. at 313-15.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 62, 66. When the AAMR revised its 1983 definition of mental
retardation in its 1992 classification text, it modified the element of "significantly subaverage general intellec-
tual functioning" to "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning." It expanded the adaptive skills portion
of the definition by reference to deficits in two or more applicable adaptive skills areas. Although the reference
age had been identified in accompanying materials in the 1983 text, the AAMR quantified the manifestation
prong of the 1992 definition by changing it from the "developmental period" to age eighteen. Accompanying
explanatory materials in both versions placed IQ cutoff scores at approximately seventy to seventy-five. In the
1992 text, the AAMR eliminated the classification system within mental retardation based on the IQ score
component of the definition (e.g., mild or moderate mental retardation). See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53,
at xi-xii, 22. When the APA revised the 1980 edition of its classification manual in 1994, it significantly
paralleled the 1992 AAMR definition, essentially differing only in the characterization of the required adaptive
behavior deficits as "significant limitations," slight differences in the wording of some of the identified adap-
tive skill areas, and the retention of the classification system within mental retardation based on IQ score. See
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 112-15; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at
41-49.
74. Although the majority of the states (and the federal system) define mental retardation generally, seven
of the eighteen states refer to mental retardation at the time of the crime. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596 (West
2000); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1999); ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-1101 to -1105 (West Pamp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie 1998); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 532.130,.135,.140 (Michie 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618
(Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995); MD. CODE ANN.,
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Fifteen of the eighteen pre-Atkins states adopted a definition of mental retardation in
their execution bans incorporating all three prongs of the clinical definition of mental
retardation.7 5 Two states did not include the manifestation prong in their definitions.76
The unique definition adopted by Kansas is based only on the intellectual functioning
component.77 The execution exclusion for mentally retarded offenders in the federal
legislation does not further define the term at all.78
All the pre-Atkins states required that a person deemed mentally retarded have sig-
nificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning or significantly subaverage intel-
lectual functioning, and five of the states did not further define these terms. 79 Nine of the
states expressly referred to an IQ score of seventy in their definitions, either establishing
such a score as a cutoff for this component of the definition or establishing a presump-
tion in connection with the score.80 One state established a rebuttable presumption of
mental retardation based on an IQ score of sixty-five or below.8 1 Two states defined this
component in terms of an IQ score two or more standard deviations below the mean for
the IQ test administered.8 2 Kansas also used this description, but added the unique re-
quirement that an offender's intellectual functioning be at a level which "substantially
impairs one's capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's
conduct to the requirements of law, 83 language resembling many criminal insanity defi-
nitions. Arizona adopted the most detailed provisions regarding this component, requir-
ing a prescreening examination to determine the IQ of all defendants regarding whom
the state is seeking the death penalty, procedures for the appointment of qualified ex-
perts and the administration of adequate testing procedures, a set of presumptions or
CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-26.1 to .7 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2002). Compare also Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993) (referring to mental retardation as a "permanent, relatively static condition"), with
APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 42, 47 (referring to the possibility of improvement in adaptive skills with
appropriate training and opportunities for persons with "mild" mental retardation to a degree that they no
longer have the level of adaptive skill impairment required for a diagnosis, rendering mental retardation "not
necessarily a lifelong disorder" and also noting that adaptive behavior problems are more likely to improve
with remedial efforts than IQ, which remains a "more stable attribute").
75. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie
1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-1101 to -1105 (West Pamp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a
(2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, .135, .140 (Michic 1999);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 2003); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
23A-27A-26.1 to .7 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.95.030 (West 2002).
76. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2000).
77. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995).
78. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596 (West 2000); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1999).
79. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-1101 to - 1105 (West Pamp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131
(Harrison 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp.
2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003) (providing no further definition).
80. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, .135,
.140 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003 Cum.
Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23A-27A-26. I to .7 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2002).
81. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1997); Jones v. State, 10 S.W.3d 449 (Ark. 2000) (rejecting
claim that rebuttable presumption of mental retardation should be at an IQ of seventy, as prescribed by the
APA and other states, rather than sixty-five).
82. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003).
83. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4623 (1995); 76-12b01 (1997).
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conclusions in favor of and against a finding of mental retardation based on IQ scores
equal to or lower than sixty-five and equal to or above seventy-five, and a requirement
that the margin of error for the test administered be considered in determining the "full
scale intelligence quotient" of seventy or below required for this component of the defi-
84nition.
Of the seventeen pre-Atkins states that included an adaptive skills component in
their mental retardation definitions, seven characterized the required deficits in adaptive
skills as "significant" or a similar term; nine did not use a qualifying adjective of this
type regarding the adaptive skills limitations; and one state used both approaches in its
references to adaptive functioning and behavior.85 Eleven states did not further define
the term in their statutes.86 Four states also included a variation of descriptive language
concerning adaptive skills used by the AAMR referring to "significant limitations in an
individual's effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal
independence, or social responsibility that are expected for his or her age level and cul-
tural group."87 Two states adopted the further reference to deficiencies in two or more
adaptive skill areas utilized in the more recent AAMR and APA definitions.88
Fifteen of the pre-Atkins states included in their definitions a requirement that men-
tal retardation manifest itself during the developmental period. 89 Three states did not
further define the term in their statutes. Ten states defined this component to require
manifestation before age eighteen, as described in the more recent AAMR and APA
definitions, and two states defined this component to require manifestation before age
twenty-two. 9°
84. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003).
85. Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-
1101 to -1 105 (West Pamp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 532.130,.135,.140 (Michie 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-26.1 to .7 (Michie Supp. 2003) (using "significant" or a simi-
lar term), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27
(McKinney Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West
2002) (using no qualifying descriptor), and ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1997) (using both descrip-
tions). But cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995) (including no adaptive skills component in its definition).
86. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-1101 to -1105
(West Pamp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie
1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, .135, .140 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202
(2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2000);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-26. I to .7 (Mi-
chic Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); see also State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 917-18
(Tenn. 1994) (interpreting "deficits in adaptive behavior" in its "ordinary sense" in the absence of statutory
definition or legislative intent otherwise); cf Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506, 516 n.14 (Ind. 1999) (declining
to adopt APA definition of adaptive behavior, but noting that APA definition may provide "some guidance" as
to the type of information useful to determine the statute's adaptive behavior component). But see Smith, 893
S.W.2d at 928-30, 933 (Reid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; dissenting regarding order denying
petition to rehear) (arguing that adaptive behavior has "accepted" meaning in field and legislative history
supports AAMR definition of term).
87. AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 22; see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.030 (West 2002); see also APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 42 (using similar descriptive lan-
guage).
88. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); supra text
accompanying note 66 (containing the more recent AAMR and APA definitions).
89. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2000) (omitting this component of the clinical definition).




Since Atkins, legislatures in seven states and the highest appellate courts in three
additional states have adopted procedures to identify mentally retarded offenders and
exclude them from execution. 9' In drafting their definitions of mental retardation, these
states have had the benefit of the Court's guidance in Penry and Atkins, as well as the
experience of the eighteen pre-Atkins states.
In addition, the post-Atkins states have had the benefit of drafting their definitional
provisions in light of the most recent modification of the AAMR mental retardation
definition. The AAMR currently defines mental retardation as a "disability characterized
by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates
before age 18. "92 While clearly maintaining the same three components of the clinical
definition, the AAMR has grouped the specific adaptive skill areas identified in its pre-
vious definition into broader adaptive skill areas, which better correspond with the rele-
vant assessment instruments. This broader grouping of adaptive skills areas also corre-
sponds with accompanying material in AAMR's classification text which defines "sig-
nificant limitations" in adaptive behavior as performance at least two standard deviations
below the mean of a standardized instrument in one of the three modified adaptive skill
categories or an overall score on a standardized measure of all three areas. Accompany-
ing material in the classification text has also replaced utilization of specific IQ scores in
defining the intellectual functioning component with references to performance at least
two standard deviations below the mean of an "appropriate" assessment instrument,
considering the standard measurement error for the instrument and its strengths and
limitations.
93
All ten post-Atkins states utilize all three components of the clinical definition of
mental retardation in their state definitions. With regard to the intellectual functioning
component, three states do not further define the term; four states utilize an IQ score of
seventy in their definitions; one state uses an IQ score of seventy-five; one state uses the
two standard deviations from the instrument mean concept; and one state court adopted
the mental retardation definition "enunciated by the Supreme Court in Atkins, especially
the [APA] definition."94 In terms of their adaptive skills component, six states include
7-131 (Harrison 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, .135, .140 (Michie 1999) (providing no further
description), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Mi-
chie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-26.1 to .7 (Michie Supp. 2003); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2002) (using before age eighteen), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997)
(using the developmental period or by age eighteen), and IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002) (using before age twenty-two); see supra text accompanying note
66 (including AAMR and APA definitions referring to age eighteen); see also AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N,
MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (John W. Jacobson &
James A. Mulick eds., 1996) (using age twenty-two in its mental retardation definition).
91. See supra note 9.
92. AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 1.
93. See id. at 23. See generally id. at 19-37, 51-71, 73-91 (describing modifications in the 2002 definition
generally and those regarding intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior).
94. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a-101 to -106, 77-18a-I (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.);
Act of June 27, 2003, 2003 La. Act 698, 2003 La. HB 1017 (to be codified at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.5.1); Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 174,
175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030) (providing no further definition), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit.l I, § 4209
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the further reference to deficits in two of the specific skill areas used in the AAMR and
APA definitions referenced in Atkins; two states incorporate the broader adaptive skill
areas used in the current AAMR definition; one state includes "significant deficiencies
in adaptive functioning that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning or impulse control,
or in both of these areas"; and one state does not further define the term.95 Finally, eight
states require that mental retardation be manifested before age eighteen, one state re-
quires manifestation before age twenty-two, and one state simply requires manifestation
during the developmental period.96
C. Application and Evidentiary Issues Regarding the Definition of Mental Retardation
The general consensus regarding the three-part clinical definition of mental retarda-
tion referenced in Penry and Atkins and reflected in the state procedural definitions
adopted before and after Atkins does not eliminate the application and evidentiary issues
that accompany utilization of the definition in the identification of mentally retarded
offenders excluded from execution by Atkins. Although the general consensus regarding
the definition suggests an ease of its application, as the manual accompanying the
AAMR's current definition relates, mental retardation is a "multidimensional" state of
functioning.97 Just as the Court recognized the AAMR's expertise in Penry and Atkins,98
(Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Sess.); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011,
1014 (Ohio 2002); Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (using an IQ score of sev-
enty), and Act of Nov. 19, 2003, 2003 I11. SB 472 (to be codified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15, 5/122-
2.2) (using an IQ score of seventy-five), and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to :1.2 (Michie,
LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess.) (using two standard deviations from the instrument mean), and Foster v.
State, 848 So. 2d 172, 175 (Miss. 2003) (adopting the Atkins definition). Cf Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453,
456 (Ala. 2002, as corrected 2003) (using an IQ score of seventy or below in appellate review, although not
adopting specific procedures), cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6155 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2003); State v. Williams, 831
So. 2d 835, 853-54 (La. 2002) (using the two standard deviations measure in the interim procedure).
95. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit.l 1, § 4209 (Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS
through 2003 Sess.); Act of Nov. 19, 2003, 2003 II1. SB 472 (to be codified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15,
5/122-2.2); Foster, 848 So. 2d at 175; Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014; Murphy, 54 P.3d at 567-68 (using the skill
areas referred to in the clinical definitions cited in Atkins), and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1
to :1.2) (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess.); Act of June 27, 2003, 2003 La. Act 698, 2003 La. HB 1017
(to be codified at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5. 1) (using broader adaptive skill areas in the current
AAMR definition), with Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to be codified at NEV.
REV. STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030) (providing no further definition), and UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 77-15a-101 to -106, 77-18a-I (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.) (including the quoted definition and
including a contingent ban if there are significant adaptive deficits without the quoted restrictions). Cf Per-
kins, 851 So. 2d at 456 (providing no further definition in appellate review, although not adopting specific
procedures); Williams, 831 So. 2d at 854 (referring to specific skill areas in interim procedure).
96. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit.l I, § 4209 (Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS
through 2003 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to : 1.2 (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Reg.
Sess.); Act of Nov. 19, 2003, 2003 I11. SB 472 (to be codified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15, 5/122-2.2);
Act of June 27, 2003, 2003 La. Act 698, 2003 La. HB 1017 (to be codified at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.5.1); Foster, 848 So. 2d at 175; Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1014; Murphy, 54 P.3d at 567-68 (using age eighteen),
and UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a-101 to -106, 77-18a-l (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.) (using age
twenty-two), with Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to be codified at NEV. REV.
STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030) (using the developmental period). Cf Perkins, 851 So. 2d at
456 (using age eighteen in appellate review, although not adopting specific procedures); Williams, 831 So. 2d
at 854 (using age twenty-two in the interim procedure).
97. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 48. Reflecting this multidimensionality, the AAMR identified
five assumptions it deemed essential to the application of its clinical definition of mental retardation:
I. Limitations in present functioning must be considered within the context of community envi-
ronments typical of the individual's age peers and culture.
2. Valid assessment considers cultural and linguistic diversity as well as differences in commu-
nication, sensory, motor, and behavioral factors.
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states can utilize that expertise in better understanding the underlying aspects of the
mental retardation definition and related application issues. Issues concerning the cor-
rect application of the term in the health and human services context, in which it is most
often used, apply with even greater force when the term determines death penalty eligi-
bility.99 Thus, if states are to properly implement Atkins, they must address these issues
in their procedures to identify mentally retarded offenders covered by. the Atkins ruling.
1. Intellectual Functioning Component
Intelligence in the context of mental retardation pertains to "general mental ability"
and includes "reasoning, planning, solving problems, thinking abstractly, comprehend-
ing complex ideas, learning quickly, and learning from experience." l °° Given the cen-
trality of intellectual functioning to the mental retardation definition, its adequate as-
sessment is essential. In the assessment of intellectual functioning, the AAMR requires
the use of standardized IQ tests with valid assessment measures and processes, coupled
with assessment team member observations and clinical judgment. The AAMR estab-
lishes an IQ cutoff for purposes of the intellectual functioning component of mental
retardation of at least two standard deviations below the mean of an "appropriate" as-
sessment instrument, considering the standard measurement error for the specific in-
struments used and the instruments' strengths and limitations.' 0' The AAMR has sum-
marized its position concerning the assessment of intellectual functioning, as follows:
The assessment of intellectual functioning is a task that requires specialized profes-
sional training. Assessment data should be reported by an examiner(s) experienced
with people who have mental retardation and qualified in terms of professional and
state regulations as well as meeting a publisher's guidelines for conducting a thor-
ough, valid psychological evaluation of the individual's intelligence functioning. In
some instances, this may require an interdisciplinary evaluation. It is important for
evaluators to familiarize themselves with the five assumptions essential to the appli-
cation of the 2002 definition of mental retardation presented in [supra note 97]. Ap-
propriate standardized measures should be determined based upon several individual
factors, including the individual's social, linguistic, and cultural background. If neces-
sary, proper adaptations must be made for any motor or sensory limitation.
Although reliance on a general functioning IQ score has been heatedly contested
by some researchers, it remains, nonetheless, the measure of human intelligence that
continues to garner the most support within the scientific community. If appropriate
standardized measures of intelligence are not available (e.g., in some developing
3. Within an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths.
4. An important purpose of describing limitations is to develop a profile of needed supports.
5. With appropriate personalized supports over a sustained period, the life functioning of the per-
son with mental retardation generally will improve.
Id. at 1.
98. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
99. See generall'y John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants with Mental
Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION:
DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS 55 (Ronald W. Conley et al. eds., 1992) (describing evaluation challenges).
100. AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 51.
101. Seeid. at 23.
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countries or when people are observed in cultural settings different from their home
countries), the general guideline for consideration of intellectual functioning should
be determined by professional clinical judgment and determined to be below the level
attained by approximately 97% of individuals (i.e., significantly below average). As
further research in this area is reported, a greater degree of precision may emerge that




The above material identifies several of the areas of concern in the application of
the intellectual functioning component of the mental retardation definition. At the out-
set, although criticisms of IQ testing range from its alleged racial and cultural insensitiv-
ity to its purported fundamental inability to accurately measure intelligence, °3 the
AAMR, APA, and American Psychological Association continue to believe that it
represents the best current assessment measure of intellectual functioning, as reflected in
their definitional materials regarding mental retardation.1°4 Assuming that standardized
instruments will be used to measure the intellectual functioning component of the men-
tal retardation definition, the question remains as to the most appropriate assessment
instruments to use. In Atkins, the Court identified the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales
test (WAIS-II) as the "standard instrument in the United States for assessing intellectual
functioning."10 5 The referenced Wechsler test, its version for persons under seventeen,
and the current Stanford-Binet test (version IV) are the instruments most frequently used
to assess intelligence.' ° 6 Because valid assessment depends on an appropriate match
between individual characteristics (e.g., linguistic and cultural factors) and the assess-
ment instrument used, however, other assessment instruments may be necessary in indi-
vidual circumstances. Of course, the most recent version of an assessment instrument
with the most updated norms should be used.'0 7
The choice of assessment instrument relates directly to the potential IQ cutoff used
in any definition of subaverage intellectual functioning. As indicated previously, many
states have incorporated a specific IQ cutoff score in their definitions of mental retarda-
tion, most often using an IQ of seventy as the cutoff for this component of the mental
retardation definition.10 8 However, most of these definitions do not acknowledge that
each assessment instrument has a standard measurement error,'°9 usually between three
and five points, and that the standard measurement error is not the same for all instru-
102. Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
103. See, e.g., id. at 52-56; Bing, supra note 54, at 72-75; Jennifer J. van Dulmen-Krantz, Current Public
Law and Policy Issue, The Changing Face of the Death Penalty in America: The Strengths and Weaknesses of
Atkins v. Virginia and Policy Considerations for States Reacting to the Supreme Court s Eighth Amendment
Interpretation, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 185, 210-12 (2002); Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2565, 2573-75 (2003); Amanda M. Raines, Note, Prohibiting the Execution of the Mentally Retarded, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 171, 199-201 (2002).
104. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 23, 51; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 41-42; AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 90, at 13.
105. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5.
106. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 58, 59-62; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 41.
107. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 56-57, 63-66.
108. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 4209 (Supp. 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130 (Michie
1999).
109. Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003) (requiring consideration of
the test "margin of error"), with, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Sess.) (contain-
ing no reference to measurement error).
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ments."10 Recognizing the impact of the standard measurement error, in the previous
AAMR definitions and the current APA definition, the IQ cutoff for mental retardation
has been quantified between seventy and seventy-five, as noted by the Court in At-
kins."' To avoid mistaken reliance on and potential misuse of a particular IQ score,
especially if it does not include consideration of standard measurement error, the
AAMR stated its current IQ cutoff in terms of being at least two standard deviations
below the mean of the specific instruments used, considering their particular standard
measurement error, strengths, and limitations. The current APA definitional material
also refers to the IQ cutoff as being approximately two standard deviations below the
mean, with reference to measurement error of approximately five points." 2 Thus, any
state's use of a fixed IQ cutoff score, without reference to standard measurement error
and other factors concerning the specific instrument used, risks an inaccurate assessment
of the intellectual functioning component of the mental retardation definition.
Finally, even if the most appropriate assessment instrument is selected and its stan-
dard measurement error is acknowledged, accurate assessment ultimately depends on
the expertise of the professional administering any instrument and interpreting its re-
sults. Not all psychiatrists, psychologists, and other professionals are trained in the ad-
ministration of these intelligence assessment instruments, especially with mentally re-
tarded populations. Adequate expertise in this regard is essential to an accurate assess-
ment. Moreover, because various biomedical, social, behavioral, and educational predis-
posing factors may contribute to mental retardation, an interdisciplinary team, or at least
access to adequate sources of relevant information, is generally required for a complete
assessment.1 13
2. Adaptive Behavior Component
Adaptive behavior refers to the "collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills
that have been learned by people in order to function in their everyday lives."' "4 This
component of the mental retardation definition seeks to assess deficits in the perform-
110. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 57-59, 67-71; APA, DSM-IV-TR, sipra note 53, at 41-42.
111. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5; AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 22; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note
53, at 41-42.
112. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 23, 57-59; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 41-42; see
also AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 90, at 13 (defining the intellectual functioning component in
terms of an IQ score two or more standard deviations below the mean of an appropriately selected, adminis-
tered, and interpreted assessment instrument). In its current materials regarding mental retardation, the APA
has maintained the classification system within mental retardation based on IQ score: "mild," representing
about eighty-five percent of the mentally retarded population, with IQs between fifty to fifty-five and ap-
proximately seventy; "moderate," consisting of about ten percent of the mentally retarded population, with IQs
between thirty-five to forty and fifty to fifty-five; "severe," representing three to four percent of the mentally
retarded population, with IQs between twenty to twenty-five and thirty-five to forty; "profound," consisting of
one to two percent of the mentally retarded population, with IQs below twenty or twenty-five; and "severity
unspecified," for those presumed to be mentally retarded but whose IQ is not testable with standard instru-
ments. See APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 42-44. The AAMR eliminated these classifications in its
1992 revision because, inter alia, they were based only on the intellectual functioning component of the defini-
tion; mischaracterized the "considerable disadvantage[s]" experienced by those labeled in the "mild" group, the
largest category; and were susceptible to incorrect application and misuse by educational and service providers
and decision makers in the criminal justice system. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 22-23, 25-26, 30-
37, 207-08. Moreover, for Atkins purposes, these distinctions are largely irrelevant because all offenders
determined to fall within the clinical definition of mental retardation are excluded from execution.
113. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 51, 66, 93-96, 123-41.
114. Id. at 73.
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ance of adaptive behavioral skills, even more than in the acquisition of such skills." 5
Although the adaptive behavior component has undergone more apparent refinements in
the AAMR definitional structure than the intellectual functioning component, again the
refinements reflect the AAMR's attempt to define essentially the same population of
mentally retarded individuals" 16 in the most effective manner for diagnostic, as well as
classification and support purposes. In this connection, in its current definition, the
AAMR modified the adaptive behavior component of its previous definition (which
referred to limitations in two of ten specific adaptive skills areas) to refer to significant
limitations in adaptive behavior as expressed in three broader areas of conceptual, so-
cial, and practical adaptive skills. The modification resulted from the AAMR's determi-
nation that although the specific skill areas might be useful in the design of supports for
a mentally retarded person, the broader adaptive skill areas are "more consistent with the
structure of existing measures and with the body of research evidence on adaptive be-
havior."' 17
In turn, the AAMR has determined that "significant limitations" in adaptive behav-
ior for purposes of its mental retardation definition can be established only through the
use of "standardized measures normed on the general population" including people with
and without disabilities. The term is then defined as performance at least two standard
deviations below the mean of "either (a) one of the following three types of adaptive
behavior: conceptual, social, or practical, or (b) an overall score on a standardized
measure of conceptual, social, and practical skills." 8 The definitional requirement of a
significant deficit in only one of the three domains is designed to minimize the variance
of correlations across domains among the assessment instruments. The requirement of a
score two standard deviations below the mean in one domain, however, "will have a
sufficiently broad impact on individual functioning as to constitute a general deficit in
adaptive behavior."" 9 In a more general sense, this definitional approach is also consis-
tent with one of the key assumptions to be utilized in the application of the AAMR's
mental retardation definition, i.e., that limitations often coexist with strengths within an
individual. Therefore, the presence of a strength in a particular area does not negate the
coexistence of a limitation in another area of sufficient significance to establish the
adaptive behavior component of the mental retardation definition.
20
As in the case of intellectual functioning assessment, selection of an appropriate
adaptive behavior assessment instrument is essential-both with regard to mentally
retarded individuals generally and with regard to any individual characteristics that
should be considered in the selection of an assessment instrument. Although many adap-
tive behavior scales exist, it is important to select an instrument of demonstrated reliabil-
ity and validity and which has norms based on people with and without disabilities. The
15. See id. at 73-74.
116. See James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penaliy: A Guide to State Legislative Issues,
27 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. (ABA) I1, 12-13 (2003) (noting that the 1983, 1992, and 2002
AAMR definitions describe the same group of individuals).
117. AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 73; see id. at 76-77, 81-82. Approximately one-third of the pre-
Atkins states and four-fifths of the post-Atkins states have incorporated some version of the AAMR definition
of the adaptive behavior component into their legislative definitions, but most of the remaining states have not
attempted to further define the term in their statutes. See supra notes 85-88, 95 and accompanying text.
118. AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 76.
119. Id. at 78.
120. See supra note 97.
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Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, Scales of Independent Behavior, and AAMR Adap-
tive Behavior Scales have all been used to assess adaptive behavior concerning mental
retardation and best practices manuals have been prepared by professional organizations
that identify additional appropriate instruments. These assessment instruments also have
standard measurement errors that must be considered in determining adaptive behavior
cutoff scores. Of course, an accurate assessment requires that professionals have the
requisite expertise to administer, score, and interpret any assessment instrument util-
ized. '
Because the adaptive behavior component of mental retardation measures the "skill
level a person typically displays when responding to challenges in his or her environ-
ment,"'2 2 assessment test administrators must be particularly sensitive to the impact of
factors such as a person's physical condition, opportunities to participate in community
life, and sociocultural background on the selection of an appropriate assessment instru-
ment and the interpretation of its results. Rather than placing sole reliance on the result
of a particular adaptive skill assessment instrument, use of different sources of data
which reflect an individual's adaptive skills is recommended. For example, interviews
with family members, teachers, or service providers who are familiar with the individ-
ual's typical behavior over an extended period of time in multiple settings can supple-
ment or aid in the interpretation of assessment results. 123 The AAMR cautions, however,
that such interviews, observations, and other sources of information about adaptive be-
havior "can complement, but ordinarily should not replace, standardized measures."
2 4
One potential non-standardized source of information of particular interest in the
context of mentally retarded capital offenders concerns the facts of the crime itself.
Some have argued that the facts of a capital crime are relevant to the adaptive behavior
component (or even the intellectual functioning component) of the mental retardation
definition; others contend these facts have no such relevance. 125 In reviewing determina-
tions of mental retardation, some appellate courts have noted, without further discussion,
expert witness review of an offender's criminal record or interview by police officers, or
cross-examination regarding crime facts. 26 In finding that a capital offender was not
mentally retarded, one reviewing court specifically noted the nature and circumstances
of the capital crime and the defendant's other criminal behavior in finding that he did not
have deficits in adaptive behavior. 12 7 Other reviewing courts, however, have expressed
concern about the potential prejudice from the introduction of capital crime facts in the
121. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 74-75, 79, 81-84, 87-91; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at
42.
122. AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 74 (citation omitted).
123. See id. at 74-75, 85-87; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 42; Shruti S.B. Desai, Effective Capital
Representation of the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 251, 272-75 (2001).
124. AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 84. Compare Rogers v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1172, 1177-79 (Ind.
1998) (finding that defendant failed to demonstrate that he did not receive an adequate evaluation because
experts based their testimony on review of independent sources of information relating to adaptive skills rather
than administering an assessment instrument), with State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 930 (Tenn. 1994) (Reid,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing the need for clinical evaluation in determining adap-
tive behavior deficits).
125. Compare, e.g., Bill Analysis, S. 3, 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2003), with, e.g., Bill Analysis, S. 51, 2003-
2004 Sess. (Cal. 2003).
126. See Rogers, 698 N.E.2d at 1178 (noting expert review of defendant's criminal records and videotaped
interview with police); State v. Dunn, 831 So. 2d 862, 884 (La. 2002) (noting cross-examination regarding
expert's failure to view videotape of the crime or review the police report).
127. See Exparte Smith, No. 1010267, 2003 Ala. LEXIS 79, at *26-29 (Ala. Mar. 14, 2003).
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mental retardation determination and have indicated that only narrowly drawn crime
facts could be introduced and only if relevant to the mental retardation determination
and if their prejudicial impact did not exceed their probative value.128 Moreover, again it
must be emphasized that even crime facts that reflect adaptive strengths do not negate
coexisting significant adaptive limitations that may sufficiently establish the adaptive
behavior component of the mental retardation definition. This component does not in-
volve a balancing of strengths and weaknesses, but only requires the establishment of
significant adaptive deficits. 1
29
3. Manifestation During the Developmental Period
The third component of the mental retardation definition requires origination or on-
set of the disability during the developmental period, which the AAMR, APA, and more
than half of the states with ban procedures have defined as the period before age eight-
een. 30 Importantly, this component does not require specific testing or a diagnosis prior
to that age, but there must be evidence of the manifestation of the disability prior to that
age.' 3' In the absence of testing conducted during the developmental period, other edu-
cational records or familial reports can supply relevant information regarding the dis-
ability's onset. In its application in this criminal context, this definitional component
provides the added benefit of reducing concern that an offender might feign symptoms
of mental retardation to avoid a potential death sentence.
32
D. Recommendations Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation
and Application Issues
The choice of a mental retardation definition for purposes of implementing the At-
kins holding is perhaps the easiest part of the development of a state's implementing
procedures. In both Penry and Atkins, the Court has clearly utilized the three-part clini-
cal definition of mental retardation in crafting its rulings concerning the exclusion of
mentally retarded offenders from execution. It specifically (and unanimously) refer-
enced the AAMR's 1983 definition in Penry. In Atkins, the Court specifically referenced
the AAMR's 1992 definition and the APA's parallel current (2000) definition before
subsequently noting that the states which provided the "national consensus" on the ex-
128. See Zant v. Foster, 406 S.E.2d 74, 76 (Ga. 1991) (requiring balance of probative value and prejudicial
impact); Lambert v. State, 71 P.3d 30, 31 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (authorizing only narrowly tailored crime
evidence if relevant to mental retardation issue and no punishment evidence in collateral review proceeding);
cf. State v. Patillo, 417 S.E.2d 139, 140-41 (Ga. 1992) (finding that jurors should not be informed of the sen-
tencing consequences of a guilty but mentally retarded verdict). But cf Foster v. State, 525 S.E.2d 78, 79-80
(Ga. 2000) (finding no error from jurors being informed that mental retardation hearing arose out of a criminal
proceeding).
129. See Ellis, supra note 116, at 13 n.29.
130. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 23; APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 53, at 41,47; supra notes
89-90, 96 and accompanying text; cf. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 90, at 13 (using age twenty-
two).
131. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 31-32 (noting more recent hesitancy to diagnose students with
mental retardation as opposed to "learning disabilities"); Ellis, supra note 116, at 13 & n.31 (noting the re-
quirement of manifestation and not testing during the developmental period).
132. See Bing, supra note 54, at 89-90; Desai, supra note 123, at 256, 272-74; see also Ellis, supra note
116, at 13-14 (noting also that the clinical literature does not indicate assessment problems from individuals
feigning mental retardation or malingering).
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clusion issue had adopted definitions of mental retardation which "generally con-
form[ed]" to these clinical definitions.' 33 The AAMR's current (2002) definition merely
further refines the definition referenced in Atkins.
In fact, all of these definitions describe essentially the same group of individuals.
They address individuals with significant limitations in intellectual functioning, as re-
flected in IQ assessments two or more standard deviations below the mean of appropri-
ate assessment instruments with reference to their standard measurement errors and
other strengths and limitations, generally corresponding to an IQ score between seventy
and seventy-five or below. This intellectual functioning deficit is accompanied by sig-
nificant limitations in adaptive functioning or behavior. The disability must have origi-
nated during the developmental period, i.e., generally prior to age eighteen. It seems
clear, therefore, that adoption of any of these clinical definitions would allow a state to
identify the mentally retarded offenders whose impairments place them "within the
range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus" exclud-
ing them from execution.
34
Although any of the referenced clinical definitions would be adequate to allow
compliance with Atkins' constitutional mandate, it is recommended that states adopting
exclusion procedures in the future or those states revising inadequate existing defini-
tions135 adopt the current (2002) AAMR definition for several reasons. On a general
basis, it represents a definitional refinement based on the most current research in the
field by the country's "oldest and largest organization of professionals working with the
mentally retarded" 136 and in the judgment of which organization the Court appears to
have great confidence in this area. Moreover, the specific refinements incorporated in
the 2002 definition are particularly well-suited to its application in this criminal justice
context. The current definition's reference to IQ cutoff scores through standard deviation
variance in appropriate assessment instruments and with further reference to standard
measurement error and the instruments' other strengths and limitations-rather than
simple numerical IQ cutoff scores-is more likely to avoid incorrect application of or
even misuse of assessment instrument results. The current description of adaptive be-
havioral limitations in the three broader adaptive skill areas is not only more consistent
with widely used assessment instruments and the research supporting them, but is also
more consistent with the relevant inquiries in this criminal justice context than the more
support system-relevant specific skill areas referenced in the 1992 definition. Moreover,
the AAMR's requirement of the utilization of adaptive behavior assessment instruments
and specification of requisite standard deviation variance better assures accurate deter-
133. See Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting the Court's citing of these clinical
definitions "with approval" and that the Court "presumably expected that states will adhere to these clinically
accepted definitions when evaluating an individual's claim to be retarded"); see also supra notes 61-70 and
accompanying text (describing the Court's use of the clinical definitions).
134. See Ellis, supra note 116, at 12-14; supra notes 59 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317
(2002)), 61-70, 92-93 and accompanying text.
135. Ten capital punishment states do not yet have statutory or judicially established procedures to identify
mentally retarded offenders and exclude them from execution. See supra notes 7, 9 and infra note 373 and
accompanying text. Other states, with "underinclusive" definitions of mental retardation, will need to revise
their definitions to make them consistent with the class of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is
.national consensus," as defined in Atkins. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995) (limiting its definition
to an intellectual functioning component and essentially requiring an individualized lack of culpability find-
ing).
136. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
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minations of this component of the definition. Finally, the consistent definitional quanti-
fication of the disability's origination prior to age eighteen not only further categorizes
this population for purposes of this criminal justice application, but also reduces con-
cerns about feigned manifestation of the disability. Thus, although any of the above
clinical definitions of mental retardation should permit a state's compliance with Atkins,
the 2002 AAMR definition is best suited for this purpose.'
37
The greater challenge in this area pertains to states' adoption of adequate mecha-
nisms to ensure the availability of the necessary expertise to implement the required
assessment of mental retardation for purposes of the constitutional exclusion from exe-
cution. As the AAMR notes, this typically requires the "administration of an individual-
ized assessment of intelligence, an individualized assessment of adaptive behavior, and
a determination made through review of documents and interviews with relevant ob-
servers that the disability was present before the age of 18.',138 Often, clinical judgment
is required based on the "clinician's explicit training, direct experience with people who
have mental retardation, and familiarity with the person and the person's environ-
ment."'
39
Accurate assessment of mental retardation is essential to implementation of Atkins'
constitutional mandate. However, there are many stereotypes and a corresponding se-
vere lack of knowledge about mental retardation in the general public, the legal profes-
sion, and even among those characterized as "experts" by virtue of their professional
degrees."40 For example, in one case, the court-appointed psychiatrist testified that to
satisfy the statutory standard clinical definition of mental retardation a person would
have an "IQ of less than 50, would not be able to follow directions, handle money, read,
or write, and could perform only the most simple and repetitive jobs under supervision"
and the court-appointed clinical psychologist described a qualifying person as one who
would be "unable to dress himself or herself, not know when to eat or how to cook, and
would require the constant care of someone else." 4' These characterizations obviously
do not describe the full range of individuals whose limitations are addressed by the
137. See Alexis Krulish Dowling, Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's
Ban on Executing the Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 802-07 (2003); Ellis, supra note 116,
at 12-14 (recommending the 2002 AAMR definition); cf. Bing, supra note 54, at 139-41 (recommending the
then current 1992 AAMR definition); Implementing Atkins, supra note 103, at 2577, 2582-84 (noting differing
goals between law and medicine in the adoption of a definition of mental retardation and recommending a
non-standardized definition that includes the 1992 and 2002 definitions, in part); Raines, supra note 103, at
197-98 (recommending the then current 1992 AAMR definition). The Atkins decision has generated consider-
able attention regarding mentally retarded individuals, in general, and the AAMR's definition, in particular, at
a time when the AAMR has acknowledged that the field of mental retardation is continuing to evolve as it
gains a more complete understanding of the condition itself. This requires refinement of the language used to
define and classify the condition, as in its 2002 text, and even raises the possibility of eventually replacing the
term "mental retardation" with an alternative term because of its stigmatizing effect and tendency to oversim-
plify this complex condition. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at xii-xiii, 197-209. For Atkins purposes,
however, even if there were such a modification of the labeling term itself, it would not affect the underlying
components of the clinical definition upon which the Atkins holding was based and regarding which there is
wide consensus.
138. AAMR, I 0th ed., supra note 53, at 93-94.
139. Id. at 95. See generally id. at 93-96 (concerning clinical judgment); James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luck-
asson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 484-93 (1985) (regarding need
for expertise in criminal justice context).
140. See Implementing Atkins, supra note 103, at 2580-81.
141. Rogers v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1172, 1179, 1180 (Ind. 1998); see State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 930
(Tenn. 1994) (Reid, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing trial court's apparent lack of
understanding of mental retardation criteria).
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clinical definition of mental retardation. How then can states assure that those involved
in the criminal justice investigation and determination of mental retardation and the
"experts" contributing to this process have the necessary expertise to make the mental
retardation determination?
State statutory assessment procedures vary considerably. On one end is Arizona's
process that requires a prescreening IQ assessment by a psychological expert for all
defendants regarding whom the state is seeking the death penalty. If the examination
reveals an IQ score of seventy-five or less, a subsequent independent assessment of
mental retardation by one or more additional psychological experts is required. All of
these experts must be state licensed and have at least two years' experience in the test-
ing, evaluation, and diagnosis of mental retardation. The statute requires that each of the
subsequent independent experts examines the defendant using "current community,
nationally and culturally accepted physical, developmental, psychological and intelli-
gence testing procedures" to determine whether the defendant has mental retardation.
The statute also requires the court to consider the "margin of error" for the test adminis-
tered in determining the defendant's IQ. On the other extreme are several other states
that make no statutory mention of the assessment and expert procedures. 
42
Of course, states are not required to statutorily define these procedures, but the de-
velopment of standardized approaches to the assessment of mental retardation will help
ensure an accurate and consistent implementation of the constitutional mandate.
43
Commentator suggestions in this regard include required standards regarding assessment
or the required use of specified assessment instruments; the requirement of a minimum
level of expertise and ethical standards for those involved in the assessment process, the
development of a pool of qualified experts, or the use of professionals already trained in
relevant assessment for the state's educational or social services systems; and the re-
quirement of minimum competence for attorneys and judges involved in the determina-
tion.'44
Legal professionals should also be familiar with the application to the determination
of mental retardation of the Court's holding in Ake v. Oklahoma.145 The Ake Court spe-
cifically held that an indigent capital defendant who can make a preliminary showing
that his sanity is a "significant factor" in the case (here through presentation of an insan-
ity defense) is, at a minimum, constitutionally entitled to government-provided access to
142. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003), with. e.g.. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2-202 (2002).
143. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 801-10 (raising concerns, including equal protection concerns, about
the lack of consistency in definitions and assessment procedures); cf Implementing Atkins, supra note 103, at
2580 (describing arbitrariness in mental retardation determinations, including two different determinations
involving two similarly situated defendants).
144. See Bing, supra note 54, at 142-43 (suggesting the use of court-appointed psychologists); Desai, supra
note 123, at 251 (describing important considerations in the effective capital representation of mentally re-
tarded offenders); Dowling, supra note 137, at 802, 807-10 (recommending uniform testing requirements,
including specific tests, and guidelines and ethical standards for experts); Dulmen-Krantz, supra note 103, at
216-17 (suggesting minimum competence standards regarding mental retardation for attorneys); Implementing
Atkins, supra note 103, at 2584-87 (recommending use of a pool of qualified experts and experts regarding
mental retardation from non-criminal fields and the consistent application of the same standardized test
throughout the state, as well as basic training regarding mental retardation forjudges and lawyers); Ellis, supra
note 116, at 14 (stressing the importance of adequate clinical evaluations); cf Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95,
148 (Miss. 2003) (requiring inclusion of Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-ll testing to detect
"malingering").
145. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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a "competent [mental health professional] who will conduct an appropriate examination
and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation" of the issue. 46 However, Ake's
rationale-the expert's value to the accurate determination of the mental health-related
issue and the unacceptable risk of error in the determination of the issue without such
assistance'14 7-applies with equal force to the mental retardation determination. Thus,
states should anticipate the application of the Ake holding to the determination of mental
retardation and incorporate its requirements into their procedures.
48
As the foregoing discussion regarding the determination of mental retardation dem-
onstrates, its assessment requires a clinically rigorous evaluation. At a minimum, states
should ensure that nationally accepted and proven assessment instruments, appropriately
matched to relevant individual characteristics of an offender, are utilized in the evalua-
tion of an offender's intellectual and adaptive behavioral functioning. Statewide guide-
lines in this regard are advisable to ensure consistency and minimum standards in the
selection of assessment instruments. 1
49
The process for the appointment of experts regarding the mental retardation deter-
mination should be standardized and should incorporate Ake requirements regarding
defense access to expert assistance. Professionals involved in the assessment process
and presentation of evidence concerning it should have demonstrated experience and
expertise regarding the evaluation and assessment process itself and its administration
and interpretation concerning mentally retarded individuals. Again, statewide guidelines
or establishment of minimum standards in this area would help identify a pool of experts
qualified to participate in the determination of mental retardation for Atkins purposes.'
5
0
Such a pool of experts can clearly include professionals from a state's educational or
social services systems if they routinely assess mental retardation using clinical defini-
tions comparable to those adopted by a state.'
Judges and attorneys who handle capital cases should be trained to recognize symp-
toms of mental retardation which might otherwise not be apparent because of their own
lack of knowledge or an offender's failure to disclose his disability.'5 2 Finally, all those
involved in the determination of mental retardation should have a thorough understand-
ing of all the components of the clinical definition adopted and the manner in which
146. Id. at 82-83.
147. See id. at 79-82.
148. See Bing, supra note 54, at 143-44; Desai, supra note 123. at 267-68; Implementing Atkins, supra
note 103, at 2578 n.87; Ellis, supra note 116, at 14. See generally Powell v. Collins, 328 F.3d 268, 281-88 (6th
Cir. 2003) (finding Ake violation from trial court's denial of motion for expert assistance regarding mental
history and condition, including mental retardation, and generally reviewing case law applying Ake); Hunter v.
Commonwealth, 869 S.W.2d 719, 721-25 (Ky. 1994) (finding that trial court's denial of continuance to obtain
mental health examination of capital defendant, including symptoms of mental retardation which could ex-
clude him from the death penalty, was abuse of discretion under Ake and state law).
149. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003) (identifying a state social services agency to adopt
rules to specify the "standardized intelligence tests" to be used in the determination of the intellectual function-
ing component); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to :1.2 (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Reg.
Sess.) (specifying assessment and expert criteria).
150. See ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2002) (establishing minimum qualifications
for experts); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a-lo to -106, 77-18a-I (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.) (estab-
lishing criteria for and expert contracting requirements regarding the examination process).
15 1. See AAMR, 10th ed., supra note 53, at 99-121 (describing other classification systems that can poten-
tially relate to a mental retardation determination).
152. See Bing, supra note 54, at 82-86; Desai, supra note 123, at 260-67; Ellis, supra note 116, at 15 n.50
(describing behavioral characteristics associated with mental retardation which may mask recognition of the
condition or complicate dealing with it in a criminal justice context).
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these components are appropriately evaluated. Because implementation of the constitu-
tional exclusion from execution depends on an accurate determination of mental retarda-
tion, any failures in the assessment and evaluation process that increase the risk of error
in this determination are unacceptable.1
53
IV. THE FACT FINDER REGARDING AND THE TIMING OF THE MENTAL RETARDATION
DETERMINATION
In contrast to the substantial guidance the Court provided in Atkins concerning the
clinical definition of mental retardation and the resultant category of mentally retarded
offenders covered by the constitutional ban on execution, the Court provided virtually
no guidance regarding the procedures required to identify such offenders and exclude
them from execution. For example, although the Court noted that the states which had
adopted bans on the execution of mentally retarded offenders-and which formed the
basis for its determination of national consensus-had adopted definitions of mental
retardation that "generally conform[ed]" to the clinical definitions it had discussed, the
Court did not mention the specific procedures these states had adopted to implement
these definitions in their ban processes. 154 Instead, the Court simply left to the states the
"task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon
[their] execution of sentences."'
55
Two central considerations in this regard are the identification of the fact finder re-
garding mental retardation and the timing of the determination in the criminal process.
The available fact finder choices are the court, the jury, or both. The timing of the men-
tal retardation decision can be prior to trial, as part of the guilt phase proceeding, or in
connection with the punishment phase following an offender's conviction for a capital
crime. Although the Court provided little guidance in Atkins regarding these issues,
Court decisions in other areas, general legal principles, and practical considerations can
help inform the development of a state's procedures in these areas. Further guidance is
provided by the experience of the states that have adopted ban procedures before and
after Atkins. Although the Atkins Court did not prescribe specific procedures required to
implement the constitutional ban, adopted procedures must be adequate to carry out
153. Cf Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-83 (1985) (including balancing of defendant and government
interests, probable value of the safeguard sought, and risk of erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if
the safeguard is not provided).
154. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304. 313-16, 317 & n.22 (2002). As the Virginia Supreme Court
noted in the Atkins remand, the Court did not even state "whether the issue of mental retardation is a question
of fact or law." Atkins v. Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 514, 515 (Va. 2003). Reviewing courts have varied in
their characterizations of the mental retardation determination as a question of law or fact. Regardless of the
label attached to it. it requires the resolution of facts to determine whether they satisfy the legal definition of
mental retardation, the legal effect of which can be an exclusion from capital punishment. See United States v.
Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 352 (5th Cir. 1998) (characterizing determination as a factual finding); Rogers v.
State, 698 N.E.2d 1172, 1180 (Ind. 1998) (noting that mental retardation is a factual determination); State v.
Dunn. 831 So. 2d 862, 887 (La. 2002) (characterizing determination as "factual/legal" in that factual evidence
is used to make legal determination of mental retardation); State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 859 (La. 2002)
(noting that trial court, not experts, must make ultimate determination of mental retardation); Richardson v.
State, 598 A.2d I, 3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), affil, 630 A.2d 238 (Md. 1993) (finding that issue is a ques-
tion of fact); Atkins, 581 S.E.2d at 515 (characterizing issue as factual one); cf Ellis, supro note 116, at 16
(finding the issue involves both questions of law and fact).




Atkins' "constitutional restriction upon [states'] execution of sentences."'156 This section
reviews the above factors before making a recommendation, consistent with the consti-
tutional mandate, regarding the optimal fact finder concerning the mental retardation
decision and the timing of the decision.
A. Legal and Practical Considerations
The identification of the fact finder regarding and the timing of the mental retarda-
tion determination should bear some relationship to the nature of the determination it-
self. In this regard, the Atkins mental retardation determination has been alternatively
compared to two other mental health-related criminal justice determinations: a criminal
competency determination, frequently a judicial determination prior to the criminal pro-
ceedings, and a determination of criminal insanity, most often a jury determination (in
contested cases) operating as an affirmative defense which follows an initial determina-
tion of guilt on the underlying crime. 57 Given the nature and effect of the mental retar-
dation determination for Atkins purposes, the comparison to criminal competency pro-
ceedings appears more appropriate. A criminal competency proceeding requires an as-
sessment of whether proffered facts satisfy the legal standard of criminal competency
which, in turn, determines a defendant's "eligibility" for the prosecution process to pro-
ceed-without regard to any individualized assessment of the defendant's culpability for
the underlying crime. On the other hand, the very determination of the facts necessary to
satisfy the legal standard of criminal insanity requires an express individualized assess-
ment of culpability for the underlying crime and an individualized absolution from such
culpability on prescribed mental health grounds and their relationship to individual cul-
pability. 1
5 8
In a manner similar to a competency determination, an Atkins proceeding requires
an assessment of whether proffered facts satisfy the legal definition of mental retarda-
tion adopted which, in turn, automatically determines a capital defendant's eligibility for
or exclusion from the death penalty-again without regard to any individualized as-
sessment of the defendant's culpability for the underlying crime. In this connection, the
Atkins Court explicitly found, as part of its findings regarding national consensus, that
..our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average offender."' 59 Unlike the role that evidence of mental retardation plays as a miti-
gating factor balanced against aggravating factors in a capital sentencing determination
of the requisite individualized culpability necessary for the imposition of a death sen-
tence, 16 the Atkins mental retardation determination simply removes a defendant from
that determination because the Court has already made the determination that a mentally
retarded offender lacks the requisite culpability to be executed. In this connection, men-
156. Id.
157. Compare Williams, 831 So. 2d at 858 (comparing determination to procedure regarding pretrial com-
petency hearings), with id. at 861 (Victory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (comparing determina-
tion to criminal insanity determinations by jury); see State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002) (sug-
gesting that the mental retardation proceedings be conducted by the court in a "manner comparable to a ruling
on competency").
158. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 557-61 (1994) (distinguishing
between criminal competency and criminal insanity).
159. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
160. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319-28 (1989).
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tal retardation is not a sentencing issue-it is an eligibility for sentencing issue. Viewed
in this way, a judicial pretrial determination of whether proffered facts satisfy the legal
definition of mental retardation and thus whether a case may proceed as a capital prose-
cution appears very similar to a judicial pretrial determination of whether proffered facts
satisfy the legal standard of criminal competency and thus whether a criminal prosecu-
tion may proceed.'
6'
Some have suggested, however, that the Court's recent rulings in Apprendi v. New
Jersey 162 and Ring v. Arizona 63 may require a jury determination of the mental retarda-
tion issue. In Apprendi, the Court addressed a state offender's due process challenge to a
"hate crimes" provision which allowed a factual finding of requisite biased purpose by a
trial judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, to increase the maximum prison sen-
tence for an underlying offense from ten to twenty years 64 In reaching its holding, the
Court concluded that the bias finding effectively served as an "element" of the crime
because the factual finding concerning it "expose[d] the defendant to a greater punish-
ment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict" on the underlying offense. The
Court contrasted this circumstance with an aggravating or mitigating "sentencing factor"
supporting a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finding of guilt
regarding a particular crime. 65 Consequently, the Court sustained the defendant's due
process challenge and held that "[other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."1
66
Only days after the Atkins decision, the Court applied its Apprendi holding in Ring
to the Arizona capital sentencing system which authorized a judicial finding of fact (be-
yond a reasonable doubt) regarding the presence of statutory aggravating circumstances
required for the imposition of a death sentence. Without the judicial finding of at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance, a capital defendant could only be sentenced to a
term of life imprisonment based on the jury's guilty verdict on the underlying capital
crime. The defendant challenged the state system as violative of the Sixth Amendment
jury trial guarantee, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
provision. 167 Although it had previously upheld the Arizona system, the Court found that
its prior holding was "irreconcilable" with Apprendi's reasoning and that "[c]apital de-
fendants, no less than non-capital defendants .... are entitled to a jury determination of
any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punish-
ment."' 68 The Court concluded that "[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors
operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury."'
169
161. Cf Sue Ann Gerald Shannon, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia: Commutation for the Mentally Re-
tarded?, 54 S.C. L. REV. 809, 833 (2003) (analogizing to judicial authority regarding competency determina-
tions).
162. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
163. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
164. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468.
165. Id. at 494 & n.19; see id. at 476-90, 492-95; id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring) (distinguishing a
"crime" which "includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast
with a fact that mitigates punishment)").
166. Id. at 490.
167. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588, 592-97, 603.
168. Id. at 589.
169. Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494); cf Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 549-50, 556,
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Some have questioned whether the Court's holdings in Apprendi and Ring require a
jury's determination of mental retardation for Atkins purposes because a finding that a
defendant is not mentally retarded subjects him to the increased potential punishment of
death. A careful reading of these decisions, however, confirms that neither requires a
jury determination of mental retardation for Atkins purposes. At the outset, unlike the
bias finding in Apprendi and the aggravating circumstance finding in Ring which reflect
a defendant's increased culpability (and hence bring the prospect of greater punishment),
it is clear that the Atkins Court held that a finding of mental retardation reflected a de-
fendant's reduced culpability which served to mitigate his potential punishment. 70 In
Apprendi, the Court carefully distinguished between the punishment enhancing facts
that required a jury determination and government proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
punishment reducing facts that did not:
[T]he principal dissent ignores the distinction the Court has often recognized between
facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation. If facts found by a jury
support a guilty verdict of murder, the judge is authorized by that jury verdict to sen-
tence the defendant to the maximum sentence provided by the murder statute. If the
defendant can escape the statutory maximum by showing, for example, that he is a
war veteran, then a judge that finds the fact of veteran status is neither exposing the
defendant to a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict ac-
cording to statute, nor is the Judge imposing upon the defendant a greater stigma than
that accompanying the jury verdict alone. Core concerns animating the jury and bur-
den-of-proof requirements are thus absent from such a scheme. 17'
Moreover, in Ring, the defendant did not even make a Sixth Amendment claim regard-
ing mitigating circumstances 172 and thus the holding requiring jury determination of the
aggravating circumstances at issue would not support such a requirement concerning the
mitigating factor of mental retardation. Finally, if the Apprendi-Ring analogy were
found applicable to the mental retardation determination (i.e., if the absence of mental
retardation were viewed as an Apprendi element of the crime), presumably these deci-
sions would compel not only a jury determination of the issue, but also government
proof beyond a reasonable doubt (and perhaps notice through indictment) for every capi-
tal offender.'
73
568 (2002) (noting that not "all facts affecting the defendant's punishment are elements" and finding that
judicial fact finding supporting judicial imposition of a statutorily increased minimum punishment was not
subject to the Apprendi holding and thus indictment allegation, jury submission, and government proof beyond
a reasonable doubt were not required).
170. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316, 317-21 (2002).
171. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n. 16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
172. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4.
173. Although the Ring holding regarding the punishment enhancing fact at issue specifically addressed the
Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee, it did not need to address the standard of proof issue because the Ari-
zona statute itself required a judicial finding of proof of the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt
(with an implicit burden of proof on the government regarding the aggravating factor). See Ring, 536 U.S. at
588-97. In Apprendi, the Court made clear that the Sixth Amendment guarantees included not only an oppor-
tunity for a jury trial, but also government proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact which served as an
.element" to potentially increase the maximum penalty for the underlying crime. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
468, 475-77; cf id. at 485 n. 12 (cautioning against a state's mischaracterization or manipulation of "elemental"
facts to avoid its corresponding Sixth Amendment obligations).
The Apprendi and Ring defendants did not raise a due process challenge to the omission in their
indictments of the penalty enhancing "elements" (recognizing that the federal constitutional presentment or
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There is no suggestion in Atkins (announced just days before Ring) that such a pro-
cedure is necessary, or even desirable, for the determination of mental retardation in this
context. Not surprisingly, the courts that have addressed this issue have consistently
determined that the finding of the absence of mental retardation is not an Apprendi-Ring
fact requiring a jury determination or government proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
74
As the Louisiana Supreme Court observed,
The Supreme Court would unquestionably look askance at a suggestion that in Atkins
it had acted as a super legislature imposing on all of the states with capital punish-
ment the requirement that they prove as an aggravating circumstance that the defen-
dant has normal intelligence and adaptive function. Atkins explicitly addressed mental
retardation as an exemption from capital punishment, not as a fact the absence of
which operates "as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense."
7 5
Thus, it does not appear that the Court's holdings in Apprendi and Ring require a jury
determination regarding the Atkins mental retardation issue.
Concerns have also been raised about the impact of a jury determination on the ac-
curacy of the mental retardation determination, especially if it is made in conjunction
with punishment proceedings following a jury's conviction of a defendant for a capital
crime. The Court itself noted in Atkins that "some characteristics of mental retardation
undermine the strength of the procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence
steadfastly guards."'176 It recognized the "reduced capacity" of mentally retarded offend-
ers as an additional justification for their categorical exclusion from execution. ,
77
The risk "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for
a less severe penalty" is enhanced, not only by the possibility of false confessions, but
also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive show-
ing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating fac-
indictment requirements had not been incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment due process provisions).
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n.3. The Apprendi Court noted, however, that its
holding had been "foreshadowed" by an observation made in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999),
construing a similar challenge to the federal carjacking statute, that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior con-
viction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6).
Following the Apprendi-Ring analogy to its logical conclusion, if a state constitutionally or statutorily required
a grand jury indictment for the prosecution of capital crimes, grand jury proof of the absence of mental retar-
dation and inclusion of this "elemental" fact in every capital indictment would be required. Even if a state did
not require the indictment process for its capital cases, the allegation of the absence of mental retardation
would need to be included in the prosecution's capital charging documents pursuant to this Apprendi-Ring
analogy.
174. See In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404-05 (5th Cir. 2003); State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 860 (La.
2002); Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 146-48 (Miss. 2003); People v. Smith, 751 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2002). But cf Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 576 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (Chapel, J., concurring in
result) (noting that proposed opportunity for jury to make de novo determination after an adverse judicial
finding is consistent with Ring). Compare Implementing Atkins, supra note 103, at 2583 n.120; Shannon,
supra note 161, at 828-29, 833 (suggesting that Ring does not govern the mental retardation finding), with
Ellis, supra note 116, at 16 (noting uncertainty about Ring's application to the mental retardation finding, but
similarity to factor addressed in Ring), and Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note, Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct.
2242 (2002). 15 CAP. DEF. J. 117, 124 (2002) (finding that absence of mental retardation is a Ring "element").
175. Williams, 831 So. 2d at 860 (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609).
176. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
177. Id. at 320.
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tors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to
their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an un-
warranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes. As Penry demonstrated,
moreover, reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged
sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future danger-
ousness will be found by the jury. Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face
a special risk of wrongful execution.
These concerns related to the general accuracy of the capital sentencing procedure
based on characteristics of mental retardation also relate to the specific mental retarda-
tion determination itself. Some judges and commentators feel that these concerns may
be more pronounced if a jury rather than a judge is the fact finder.' 79 Moreover, placing
the Atkins mental retardation determination within the punishment proceeding could be
confusing to jurors who might misconstrue it as interrelated with the culpability issues
before them or otherwise to be balanced with or against such issues.' 80 Juror determina-
tion of mental retardation during punishment proceedings also could be tainted by its
consideration in conjunction with heinous crime facts and punishment evidence unre-
lated to the mental retardation determination regarding intellectual functioning and
adaptive behavior deficits.' 8' Thus, entrusting the judge with the fact finding responsi-
178. Id. at 320-21 (citations omitted); see Bing, supra note 54, at 82-89; Desai, supra note 123, at 260-67;
Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 139, at 427-32 (describing behavioral characteristics associated with mental
retardation which may complicate dealing with it in a criminal justice context).
179. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502, 518-19 (Ga. 1998) (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting) (finding that
requested pretrial determination, rather than required jury determination during guilt phase, would "prevent[I
confusion, reduce[] prejudice, and may vastly simplify the trial of the case"); Shannon, supra note 161, at 829,
833 (raising concern about juror bias); cf Bing, supra note 54, at 141 n.593 (raising concern about a death-
qualified jury making the mental retardation determination). But cf Atkins, 536 U.S. at 354 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (expressing confidence in jurors' ability to address mental retardation as a "guilt-reducing" factor without
the need for the Court's categorical exclusion).
180. See Richardson v. State, 630 A.2d 238, 243-44 (Md. 1993) (describing how state procedure attempts
to separate the determination, during the punishment proceeding, of mental retardation as a death eligibility
factor from consideration as a mitigating factor); Implementing Atkins, supra note 103, at 2583 n.120 (noting
potential juror confusion); cf supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that an Atkins
mental retardation determination does not involve an individualized culpability determination, but only a death
eligibility determination). See generally Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death:
Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 101l
(200 1) (reviewing capital juror interviews describing blurring of guilt and punishment issues).
181. See State v. Patillo, 417 S.E.2d 139, 140-41 (Ga. 1992) (finding that witnesses in a mental retardation
proceeding generally should not be examined in a way to inject sentencing issues into the proceeding); Mur-
phy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 575-77 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (Chapel, J., concurring in result) (expressing con-
cern about jurors in punishment phase determination of mental retardation being tainted by death penalty-
related evidence that "can only improperly appeal to jurors' emotions and passions"); Bing, supra note 54, at
142 (raising concern about juror prejudice against the defendant); cf William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed
Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision
Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476 (1998) (describing interviews of capital jurors regarding sentencing deter-
minations). But see People v. Smith, 751 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (concerns raised regarding
unreliable or biased jury determination of mental retardation based upon "pure unsubstantiated speculation");
but cf Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80-82 (1985) (describing use of experts to assist jurors in fact finding
regarding criminal insanity).
Reviewing courts have varied in their positions regarding whether the facts of the capital crime are
relevant to the determination of mental retardation at all or, at least, whether the presentation of such facts
must be narrowly tailored to the mental retardation issue and their probative value balanced against their
prejudicial impact. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. Whatever the position taken, however, it is
clear that placing the mental retardation determination during the capital jury's punishment proceedings would




bility regarding mental retardation could reduce or eliminate these accuracy-reducing
concerns and potentially heighten accuracy by the court's familiarity with expert testi-
mony generally and the ability to gain expertise in its consideration regarding mental
retardation specifically.1
82
Finally, it has been suggested that a pretrial determination of mental retardation by
the court would be more efficient and less costly than a jury resolution of the issue. It is
contended that a judge's pretrial determination that a defendant is mentally retarded will
avoid the significant costs associated with a capital trial proceeding, such as more exten-
sive jury selection procedures and attorney representation. 183 However, the efficiency
and cost reduction arguments only apply if a defendant is found mentally retarded in a
pretrial proceeding. If the defendant is not found mentally retarded prior to trial, some
(or all) of the pretrial evidence could be introduced again at a punishment proceeding
upon conviction to establish or rebut mental retardation as a factor mitigating punish-
ment, 84 and would thereby potentially extend the proceedings rather than shorten
them. 185
B. States 'Identification of the Fact Finder Regarding and Timing of
the Mental Retardation Determination
Unlike in the case of the mental retardation definition, neither Atkins nor other legal
or practical considerations compel the states' selection, from the range of available
choices, of a specific fact finder regarding and timing of the mental retardation determi-
nation. Perhaps, as a result, states have demonstratcd greater variety in making these
182. In reviewing the adequacy of state procedures to implement the constitutional ban on the execution of
insane offenders recognized in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), it was noted:
The adequacy of a state-court procedure [for federal habeas corpus review purposes] is
largely a function of the circumstances and the interests at stake. In capital proceedings gener-
ally, this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reli-
ability. This especial concern is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the
most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.
Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same presumptions accorded a defen-
dant who has yet to be convicted or sentenced, he has not lost the protection of the Constitution
altogether; if the Constitution renders the fact or timing of his execution contingent upon estab-
lishment of a further fact, then that fact must be determined with the high regard for truth that
befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human being. Thus, the ascertainment of a pris-
oner's sanity as a predicate to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those
demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding. Indeed, a particularly acute need for
guarding against error inheres in a determination that "in the present state of the mental sciences
is at best a hazardous guess however conscientious." That need is greater still because the ulti-
mate decision will turn on the finding of a single fact, not on a range of equitable considerations.
Id. at 411-12 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); cf. Melissa E. Whitman, Communicating with Capital
Juries: How Life Versus Death Decisions Are Made, What Persuades, and How to Most Effectively Communi-
cate the Need for a Verdict of Life, I I CAP. DEF. J. 263, 276-78 (1999) (describing studies regarding capital
jury decision making, including discussion of jurors' negative perceptions of defense expert witnesses); supra
text accompanying note 152 (recommending training for judges and attorneys regarding mental retardation).
183. See State v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835, 860 (La. 2002); Bing, supra note 54, at 141; Shannon, supra
note 161, at 829, 833; Ellis, supra note 116, at 14-15.
184. See Bing, supra note 54, at 145-46.
185. Some states with pretrial procedures also allow an interlocutory appeal of the mental retardation
determination, which would also delay the proceedings. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-703.02 (West
Supp. 2003); Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT.
174, 175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030). But see Bing, supra note 54, at 146 (suggesting that review of a




choices. Again, states that are establishing or revising Atkins procedures can benefit
from the experiences of other capital punishment states in this regard.
1. Pre-Atkins States
Of the eighteen pre-Atkins states, all eighteen require or authorize the trial court to
make the mental retardation determination in specified circumstances and ten states
require or authorize the determination to be made prior to trial.186 More specifically, five
states require the trial court to make a pretrial determination of mental retardation. 187 In
one additional state, the timing of the trial court's determination is not specified, but the
state's supreme court permits and has encouraged defendants to raise the issue by pre-
trial motion. 188 Three states require or authorize the trial court to determine the mental
retardation issue prior to trial and if the court does not find that the defendant is mentally
retarded, the defendant can seek a de novo determination of the issue by the jury in the
punishment phase of the proceedings. 89 One state authorizes a trial court determination
of mental retardation either before trial or through a post-guilt verdict hearing conducted
by the court separately or contemporaneously with the punishment proceeding.' 90 Geor-
gia, the first state to prohibit execution of mentally retarded offenders, has a unique
procedure which requires the trial court to conduct a pretrial hearing to ensure there is a
"factual basis" for a defendant's plea of "guilty but mentally retarded"; this plea is re-
solved by the jury, or the court acting as trier of fact, at the guilt stage of the proceed-
ing.' 9' In three states, the trial court makes the mental retardation finding after convic-
tion, but before sentencing for the capital crime.' 92 In two states, the jury, or court, as
sentencer, makes the mental retardation finding during the sentencing proceeding. 193 In
one state, the trial court conducts a hearing to determine mental retardation after the
advisory jury has recommended a death sentence. 94 Finally, in one state, the timing of
the trial court's determination is not stated. 95 No implementing procedure is specified in
the federal statute. 1
96
186. See infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text. Most of these states also include provisions specifying
how and when the defendant can raise the mental retardation issue. See infra notes 187-95;-see also infra notes
198-202 (regarding post-Atkins states).
187. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-1102
(West Pamp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130,
.135,.140 (Michie 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-26.l to .7 (Michie Supp. 2003).
188. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 916 & n.2 (Tenn. 1994).
189. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1997) (requiring pretrial determination); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
565.030 (West Supp. 2003) (authorizing pretrial determination with parties' and court's agreement); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002) (authorizing pretrial determination on defendant's motion and requiring such with
government's consent).
190. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003) (allowing a defendant to seek the
court's mental retardation determination either pretrial or after conviction).
191. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502, 509 (Ga. 1998)
(upholding trial court denial of request for separate trial regarding mental retardation because state statute
requires determination during guilt phase). But see id. at 518-19 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting) (describing merits
of a pretrial determination of mental retardation).
192. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2. I (Michie 2000).
193. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-202, -303 (2002);
Richardson v. State, 630 A.2d 238, 241-44 (Md. 1993) (construing procedural operation of statute).
194. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003).
195. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2002).




Of the ten states that have legislatively or judicially developed procedures regarding
the mental retardation determination since Atkins, all ten require or authorize the trial
court to make the determination in specified circumstances and seven of the nine states
with applicable procedures require or authorize the determination to be made before
trial.' 97 Five states require or authorize the trial court to make a pretrial determination of
mental retardation. 198 In one state, the trial court is authorized to determine mental retar-
dation before trial (by agreement of the parties) and if the court finds that the defendant
is not mentally retarded, the defendant can raise the issue again to the jury during the
sentencing proceeding.' 99 In one state, if the issue is not resolved before trial, the sen-
tencer (court or jury) determines the issue during the punishment proceeding. 2°° In one
state, the guilt fact finder (court or jury) determines mental retardation during the sen-
tencing proceeding.2° ' In one state, the trial court makes factual findings regarding men-
tal retardation after the punishment hearing as part of its determination of sentence. °2
C. Recommendations Concerning the Fact Finder Regarding and the Timing of the
Mental Retardation Determination
As the above discussion reflects, neither Atkins nor other controlling legal principles
compel the selection of a specific fact finder regarding mental retardation or require that
the determination be made at a specific point in the adjudication process. On balance,
however, a pretrial determination regarding mental retardation by the court is recom-
mended as the optimal process 20 3 for several reasons. At the outset, it is most consistent
F.3d 308, 351-53 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no plain error in the trial court's sua sponte entry of its factual find-
ing concerning mental retardation after entering a death sentence).
197. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text. Mississippi has only judicially developed a collateral
review procedure in which the court makes the mental retardation finding. See Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172,
175 (Miss. 2003).
198. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a- 10 1
to -106, 77-18a-I (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.); Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev.
AB 15 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030); cf. Act of Nov. 19, 2003,
2003 Ill. SB 472 (to be codified at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15, 5/122-2.2) (including defendant option in
specified circumstances of raising the mental retardation issue at "aggravation and mitigation" rather than
"eligibility"); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio 2002). Although the procedure the Ohio Supreme Court
developed in Lott was in the context of a collateral review case, the court also stated that the procedure would
apply to capital cases pending trial and to claims of mental retardation raised at trial. The appellate court did
not explicitly dictate the timing of the trial court's mental retardation determination in these circumstances.
However, by stating that a "trial court's ruling on mental retardation should be conducted in a manner compa-
rable to a ruling on competency," at the very least the trial court is authorized, if not required, to make the
determination prior to trial. See id. at 1014-16.
199. See Act of June 27, 2003, 2003 La. Act 698, 2003 La. HB 1017 (to be codified at LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1); cf. State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 860-61 (La. 2002) (requiring pretrial determi-
nation by the court in the interim procedure).
200. See Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567-69 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (including opportunity for court
post-sentencing hearing review if jury does not find mental retardation). But see id. at 575-77 (Chapel, J.,
concurring in result) (criticizing complexity and other features of prescribed procedure and recommending
pretrial court determination with opportunity for de novo review of adverse determination by jury after convic-
tion, but prior to consideration of punishment evidence); id. at 572 (Johnson, V.P.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (agreeing with the procedure recommended by Judge Chapel).
20). See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to :1.2 (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess.).
202. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 2002).
203. See Bing, supra note 54, at 141-42; Shannon, supra note 161, at 833-34 (suggesting pretrial court
determination); cf. Ellis, supra note 116, at 16-17 (suggesting, to avoid Ring concerns, pretrial court determi-
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with the nature of the determination, as defined by Atkins. The Court in Atkins has con-
verted mental retardation from a factor to be considered solely as part of an individual-
ized assessment of requisite offender culpability for capital punishment to a factor de-
termining death penalty eligibility. By making a categorical assessment that mentally
retarded offenders as a class have insufficient culpability to be sentenced to death, the
Atkins Court has removed all individualized culpability issues from the determination
and has narrowed the determinative issues to simply an offender's satisfaction of the
adopted clinical definition of mental retardation. Unlike the determination of criminal
insanity and other culpability-related matters often entrusted to a jury, this narrowed
issue of mental retardation itself is the type of threshold issue most often conmitted to
the court.20 4
Moreover, a pretrial resolution by the court seems most likely to avoid the accu-
racy-diminishing concerns expressed by the Atkins Court regarding adjudicatory pro-
ceedings involving mentally retarded offenders. Such concerns would be especially
pronounced in procedures in which the mental retardation determination is made during
or after punishment proceedings in which the fact finder has been exposed to a variety
of prejudicial guilt and punishment evidence unrelated to the mental retardation deter-
mination.20 5 Any procedure that could not sufficiently ensure the accuracy of the mental
retardation determination could risk being deemed inadequate to "enforce the constitu-
tional restriction [Atkins placed upon states') execution of sentences. 20 6 Thus, a pretrial
determination of mental retardation by the court is most consistent with the spirit of the
Atkins holding and most likely to achieve its intended purpose of excluding mentally
retarded offenders from execution.0 7
nation with opportunity for de novo consideration of adverse result by jury after guilt determination, but before
sentencing proceeding, or pretrial determination by a separate jury which will not adjudicate guilt).
204. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. This mental retardation determination is also similar
to the requirement of a "judicial evaluation of [a defendant's] claim of insanity before [a death] sentence can
be executed." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
205. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
206. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17 (plurality opinion)). In entrusting to the
states the task of developing appropriate mechanisms to carry out the constitutional ban on the execution of
insane offenders, the Ford opinion identified the "lodestar of any effort to devise a procedure [as] the overrid-
ing dual imperative of providing redress for those with substantial claims and of encouraging accuracy in the
factfinding determination." Ford, 477 U.S. at 417 (plurality opinion); see id. at 410-12.
207. One commentator has suggested that although the Atkins Court has not specified a fact finder for the
mental retardation determination, it "seems to lean in favor of the judge." Implementing Atkins, supra note
103, at 2583 n.120.
One argument in favor of what appears to be the Atkins Court's preference for the judge as
factfinder involves an examination of the decision's context. The fact that Atkins comes as an
additional layer of protection on top of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which insisted
that juries be permitted to consider mental retardation as a mitigator, suggests that mental retar-
dation should be removed from the typical balancing process in sentencing. As a substantive re-
striction on capital punishment, the determination of mental retardation requires procedural pro-
tections greater than what Penry demands. To place it in the same mix as the aggravators and
mitigators analyzed as part of the jury's sentencing determination runs the risk that the jury will
not recognize its mandatory nature and will instead balance it against other factors.
Id.
Some have also supported a pretrial judicial determination of mental retardation on cost and efficiency
grounds. As discussed, supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text, reduced costs and greater efficiency can be
assumed if the court makes an uncontested finding of mental retardation in pretrial proceedings, but such a
result is not the only possible outcome of a pretrial proceeding. Moreover, although certainly desirable, cost
and efficiency should not be the ultimate determinants of the satisfaction of this constitutional imperative.
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This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the majority of states that have
adopted procedures to identify mentally retarded offenders and exclude them from exe-
cution have chosen to require or authorize the court to make the mental retardation de-
termination prior to trial. All twenty-eight states with legislative or judicial procedures
require or authorize the court to make the mental retardation determination in specified
circumstances. Seventeen of the twenty-seven states with applicable procedures require
or authorize the mental retardation determination to be made prior to trial.20 8 This sup-
port by states-adopting procedures before and after Atkins-for the availability of a
pretrial opportunity for the court to resolve the mental retardation issue further suggests
the merit of this approach.
Finally, although some states have chosen to provide both a pretrial court resolution
of the mental retardation issue and a de novo determination by the jury if the court does
not find mental retardation, 20 9 such a dual determination opportunity is not required to
assure the accuracy of the determination.2 10 Of course, if the trial court does not find a
defendant is mentally retarded in a pretrial proceeding for purposes of the Atkins exclu-
sion, the defendant would nevertheless be able to present evidence concerning mental
retardation during any punishment proceeding as a mitigating circumstance 2" and sev-
eral states explicitly provide for this in their statutes.2t2
V. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF REGARDING THE MENTAL
RETARDATION DETERMINATION
The identification of the burden of proof and standard of proof regarding the mental
retardation determination is as important to the resolution of this issue as the selection of
the fact finder and timing of the determination. The potential choices in these additional
areas are obvious. The burden of proof regarding mental retardation is assigned to either
the defendant or the government and the potential standards of proof are preponderance
of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.213
208. See supra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 189, 199 and accompanying text.
210. Accuracy in the court's determination of mental retardation can be assured through the opportunity for
appellate review of the determination--either through an interlocutory appeal or following the imposition of a
death sentence. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130 (West 2002) (describing mandatory appellate
review of mental retardation determination); Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to
be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030) (including interlocutory appeal
procedure and mandatory review following imposition of a death sentence); State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835
(La. 2002) (reviewing mental retardation issue raised in direct appeal); Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535 (Mo.
2003) (reviewing mental retardation determination in context of request for collateral relief); see infra notes
314-28 and accompanying text (describing appellate review of mental retardation findings).
211. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319-28 (1989); supra note 30.
212. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01
(2003 Cum. Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); see also Rogers v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1172, 1181
(Ind. 1998) (noting that although trial court did not find defendant mentally retarded in pretrial determination
for purposes of statutory exclusion, court considered evidence of mental retardation as significant mitigating
factor in rejecting jury recommendation of death sentence).
213. See JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 508-18 (5th ed. 1999) (describing burden of proof
and standard of proof). The discussion in this section focuses on the ultimate burden of proof rather than the
initial burden of production, associated with the raising of the mental retardation issue. Although the court (or
presumably any party) could sua sponte raise the mental retardation issue, most states that have explicitly
addressed the issue have included some type of notice provision through which the defendant raises the mental
retardation issue and which triggers the opportunity for or requirement of a clinical examination of the defen-
dant. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.135 (Michie 1999);
Act of June 27, 2003, 2003 La. Act 698, 2003 La. HB 1017 (to be codified at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
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The Atkins Court did not specify what selections from these choices would be required
to implement the constitutional ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders.
Once again, however, other Court decisions and the actions of the implementing states
can provide some guidance in this regard for states attempting to carry out the requisites
of the Atkins holding. These considerations inform the recommendations regarding the
selection of the burden and standard of proof that conclude this section.
A. Court Guidance Regarding Selection of the Burden and Standard of
Proof Requirements
Although the Atkins Court did not specify a particular required burden or standard
of proof concerning the mental retardation determination, the Court's holding clearly did
give the determination itself constitutional significance. As a result, as in the case of the
selection of the fact finder and timing of the determination, all procedures chosen to
implement the constitutional ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders should
further the achievement of accuracy in the determination.2t 4 As was noted regarding
procedures to implement the constitutional ban on the execution of insane offenders
recognized in Ford v. Wainwright,215 not only must such procedures achieve a "degree
of reliability required for the protection of any constitutional interest, ' 216 but, in the capi-
tal context, they must also further the "clear need for trustworthiness in any factual find-
ing that will prevent or permit the carrying out of an execution."217 It is with recognition
of this heightened need for accuracy in the implementation of the constitutional interest
in excluding mentally retarded offenders from execution, that other Court decisions
regarding appropriate burdens and standards of proof must be considered.21 8
The Court's holding in Patterson v. New York2 1 9 can provide some guidance regard-
ing the appropriate selection of the burden of proof concerning the mental retardation
determination. In Patterson, the Court considered a due process challenge to New
York's assignment to the defendant of the burden of proof to establish "extreme emo-
tional disturbance." Proof of this circumstance served as an affirmative defense to a
charge of second-degree murder in order to reduce the charge to manslaughter.22 ° In
addressing the defendant's claim, the Court characterized the challenged affirmative
defense as a "mitigating circumstance" and an expanded version of the common law
"heat of passion" defense. The Court further noted that the burden of proof regarding the
905.5.1). Assigning to the defendant the burden of raising the mental retardation issue and initially producing
some evidence in support of it is appropriate. See Ellis, supra note 116, at 15.
214. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
215. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
216. Id. at 413 (plurality opinion).
217. Id. at 418 (plurality opinion).
218. In reviewing challenges to the constitutional adequacy of states' selection of burdens and standards of
proof in implementing their criminal law and procedure, the Court has expressed some general deference to
states' selections. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992) (reviewing burden and standard
of proof); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (reviewing burden of proof). The Court's due
process review of such selections nevertheless necessitates a determination whether the procedures-when
challenged-violate constitutionally required principles of "fundamental fairness." See Medina, 505 U.S. at
448.
219. 432 U.S. at 197.
220. See id. at 198-201. Although the Patterson Court directly addressed the state's allocation of the bur-
den of proof, the Court also noted that the defendant was required to establish this affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. See id. at 200.
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common law version of the defense "as well as other affirmative defenses-indeed, 'all.
. . circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation'-rested on the defendant.
221
Although there had been some deviation in modern times from the application of this
common law principle, the Court declined to constitutionally require government proof
of the "non-existence of all affirmative defenses."222 As long as a state maintains its
obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the underlying crime,
If the State nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of
criminality or punishment, we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been
established with reasonable certainty. To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance
does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is
put in issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too
inaccurate.
223
Although the Patterson Court rejected a due process challenge to the procedures to
implement a state-established affirmative defense, the Court in Medina v. California
2 24
applied the Patterson analytical approach to its review of burden and standard of proof
allocations concerning constitutionally required criminal competency. The defendant in
Medina had raised a due process challenge to California law, pursuant to which a defen-
dant's competency was presumed and the burden of proof was placed on the defendant
to establish criminal incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. 225 In determin-
ing whether the State's placement of these proof burdens "offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun-
damental,, 226 the Court first looked at historical practice regarding the placement of the
competency proof burdens and found it inconclusive. The Court next considered
whether the procedures violated any established principle of "fundamental fairness" in
operation. In this regard, the Court found that the California proof allocation would
affect only a "narrow class" of competency determinations where the evidence is in
"equipoise," i.e., the evidence in favor of and against an incompetency finding is evenly
balanced.227 The Court concluded that the state had satisfied due process concerns by
providing defendants access to competency evaluation procedures and a "reasonable
opportunity" to prove their incompetency. The Court further concluded that there was no
additional constitutional requirement that the state "assume the burden of vindicating the
221. Id. at 202 (citations omitted).
222. Id. at 210; see id. at 202-11. But see id. at 210-11 (indicating the existence of "constitutional limita-
tions" on states' inappropriate reallocation of burdens of proof to avoid governmental proof obligations); id. at
223 ( Powell, J., dissenting) (warning against inappropriate shifting of burdens of proof as a result of Court's
holding).
223. Id. at 209; see Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976) (dismissing challenge to state statute requir-
ing defendant proof of insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
(1952) (rejecting due process challenge to state statute requiring defendant proof of insanity defense beyond a
reasonable doubt). But see Patterson, 432 U.S. at 226 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that due process requires
government proof beyond a reasonable doubt of factors that make a "substantial difference in punishment and
stigma"); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (finding due process violation in statute that required a
defendant to rebut statutory presumption of malice aforethought by proof of "heat of passion" evidence and
thus improperly shifted proof burden regarding an element of the charged offense).
224. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
225. See id. at 439-46.
226. Id. at 446 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202).
227. See id. at 446-49.
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defendant's constitutional right [not to be tried while incompetent] by persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant is competent to stand trial. ,
228
Subsequently in Cooper v. Oklahoma,2 29 however, the Court unanimously held that
Oklahoma's requirement that a defendant prove his incompetency by the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard violated due process. At the outset, the Court distinguished
the procedure it had upheld in Medina (which affected only the small class of cases in
which the evidence was evenly balanced under the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard at issue) from Oklahoma's utilization of the clear and convincing evidence standard
which necessarily meant that a defendant could establish that he was more likely than
not incompetent and still not satisfy his evidentiary burden under this heightened stan-
dard.23° Moreover, neither historical nor modem practice supported the "fundamental"
nature of Oklahoma's procedure. Indeed, the fact that only three other states currently
used the clear and convincing evidence standard regarding competency suggested that
its use offended a deeply rooted principle of justice.23'
In addition, the Court found that Oklahoma's heightened evidentiary standard failed
to exhibit "fundamental fairness" in operation. Rather than protecting the fundamental
right of an incompetent defendant not to stand trial, the Oklahoma standard imposed a
"significant risk" that a defendant would be erroneously found competent. Because the
exercise of the remainder of his trial-related constitutional rights is dependent upon
criminal competency, the consequences of an erroneous competency determination are
"dire" for a defendant. To the contrary, the Court found that the risk of an erroneous
competency determination to the state is "modest." While acknowledging that the chal-
lenges inherent in the competency determination might warrant the placement of the
burden of proof on its proponent, the Court found that they did not justify the "additional
onus" of an "especially high" standard of proof.
232
A heightened standard does not decrease the risk of error, but simply reallocates
that risk between the parties. In cases in which competence is at issue, we perceive no
sound basis for allocating to the criminal defendant the large share of the risk which
accompanies a clear and convincing evidence standard. We assume that questions of
competence will arise in a range of cases including not only those in which one side
will prevail with relative ease, but also those in which it is more likely than not that
the defendant is incompetent but the evidence is insufficiently strong to satisfy a clear
and convincing standard. While important state interests are unquestionably at stake,
in these latter cases the defendant's fundamental right to be tried only while compe-
228. Id. at 449; see id. at 451. But see id. at 457-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rejecting Court's analytical
approach and finding that procedures to protect fundamental right of competency must be adequate and that
government should bear risk of erroneous determination through assumption of burden of proof). See gener-
ally Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Competency to Stand Trial: An
Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court s New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817 (1993).
229. 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
230. See id. at 353-56.
231. See id. at 356-62.
232. See id. at 362-66.
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tent outweighs the State's interest in the efficient operation of its criminal justice sys-
tem.233
Although acknowledging its traditional deference to states' development of their crimi-
nal procedural laws, the unanimous Court concluded that Oklahoma's requirement that a
defendant prove his incompetency by clear and convincing evidence was insufficiently
protective of the constitutional fight of an incompetent defendant not to stand trial, that
it offended a "fundamental" principle of justice, and that it thus violated due process.3
B. Pre-Atkins and Post-Atkins States
The holdings of Patterson, Medina, and Cooper suggest that it would be constitu-
tionally permissible to assign the defendant the burden of proof to establish his mental
retardation, but by a standard of proof no higher than preponderance of the evidence. In
fact, this is the approach taken by the majority of states that have legislatively enacted or
judicially implemented bans before and after Atkins. All of the states that have expressly
assigned a burden of proof regarding mental retardation have assigned this burden to the
defendant.235
Although there was somewhat greater variety among the pre-Atkins states, the clear
majority of all states that have selected a standard of proof regarding this issue have
chosen the preponderance of the evidence standard. Among the pre-Atkins states, nine
selected the preponderance of the evidence standard, four selected the clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard, one state used both of these standards (depending on the fact
finder), and three states did not explicitly define the applicable standard of proof.
23 6
233. Id. at 366-67.
234. See id. at 367-68. in a portion of the Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), decision that probably
was not overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Court narrowly upheld the Arizona capital
sentencing procedure which assigned the defendant the burden to prove the existence of "mitigating circum-
stances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency" by a preponderance of the evidence. See Walton, 497 U.S.
at 649-51 (plurality opinion); id. at 656-74 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (finding
that the defendant's challenge regarding mitigating circumstances failed to state an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion based on his rejection of the Court's mitigating circumstances capital jurisprudence). But see id. at 677-90
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding that Arizona's procedure unconstitutionally restricted consideration of
mitigating circumstances).
235. See supra note 7 (identifying pre-Atkins states; Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri,
Nebraska, and New Mexico do not expressly assign the burden of proof, but most of these states include
procedures for a defendant to provide notice of or seek a ruling on the mental retardation issue), see supra note
9 (identifying post-Atkins states; Idaho does not expressly assign the burden of proof, but does include a pro-
cedure for a defendant to provide notice of the intention to raise the mental retardation issue and to seek a
hearing). See also Lott v. State, 779 N.E.2d 10 11, 1015-16 (Ohio 2002) (placing burden of proof on defendant
does not violate due process, citing Medina rationale). But see Ellis, supra note 116, at 16-17 (questioning
whether the burden of proof can be placed on the defendant as a result of the Ring decision concerning proof
of facts that increase the maximum punishment for an offense).
236. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (Michie 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23A-27A-26. I to .7 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2002) (adopting preponderance standard), with ARIZ, REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02
(West Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-1101 to -1 105 (West Pamp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.137 (West Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-1 to -7 (Michie 1998) (adopting clear and convincing
evidence standard), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002) (adopting clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard for pretrial court determination and preponderance standard for any subsequent jury determination), and
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130,
.135, .140 (Michie 1999) (not expressly defining the standard of proof).
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Although Georgia alone adopted a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in its statutory
"guilty but mentally retarded" plea procedure, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted a
preponderance of the evidence standard for claims of mental retardation raised on col-
lateral review. 237 Among the post-Atkins states, drafting their procedures to implement a
constitutionally protected right rather than a state-created protection, nine states have
adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard and one state selected the clear and
convincing evidence standard.238 The federal statute does not incorporate a burden or
standard of proof concerning its exclusion.239
C. Recommendations Concerning the Burden and Standard of Proof
Regarding Mental Retardation
Utilizing the rationale articulated by a unanimous Court in Cooper (and consistent
with the holdings in Medina and Patterson), it is recommended that, for purposes of the
Atkins exclusion from execution, states assign the defendant the burden of proof to es-
tablish mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.240 Be-
cause of the inherent nature of the mental retardation determination, the proof necessary
The Indiana Supreme Court rejected a defendant's challenge, based on Cooper, to the state's require-
ment that a defendant prove mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence for purposes of the state
exclusion from execution. The appellate court distinguished Cooper by finding that its holding addressed a
constitutional interest central to "fundamental" justice principles whereas the Indiana procedure only affected
state-selected sentence eligibility, not constitutionally constrained by the then applicable Penry holding. See
Rogers v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1172, 1174-76 (Ind. 1998). The constitutional status that Atkins subsequently
attached to this sentence eligibility issue undercuts the state court's rationale for distinguishing Cooper and
upholding the clear and convincing evidence standard. See Ellis, supra note 116, at 15.
237. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998), with Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342-43
(Ga. 1989) (adopting collateral review procedure after finding that execution of mentally retarded offenders
violates state constitution). See Mosher v. State, 491 S.E.2d 348, 351-53 (Ga. 1997) (noting Penry in distin-
guishing the Cooper rationale and upholding the beyond a reasonable doubt standard regarding the "guilty but
mentally retarded" plea). But see Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502, 516-19 (Ga. 1998) (Fletcher, P.J., dissent-
ing) (finding that preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt is the appropriate proof
standard, based on the application of the Cooper rationale).
238. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a- 10 1
to -106, 77-18a-I (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to :1.2
(Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess.); Act of Nov. 19, 2003, 2003 I11. SB 472 (to be codified at 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/114-15, 5/122-2.2); Act of June 27, 2003, 2003 La. Act 698, 2003 La. HB 1017 (to be codified
at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1); Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to
be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030); State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835,
861 (La. 2002); Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172, 175 (Miss. 2003); Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1015; Murphy v. State,
54 P.3d 556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (adopting preponderance standard). In selecting the preponderance
of the evidence standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court specifically referenced and applied the Cooper ration-
ale. See Williams, 831 So. 2d at 859-60. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals selected the preponderance
standard as the most appropriate despite the selection of the clear and convincing evidence standard in legisla-
tion previously vetoed by the governor. See Murphy, 54 P.3d at 568. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(Supp. 2002) (adopting clear and convincing evidence standard); Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1015-16 (restricting
collateral review claims not filed within prescribed time period to clear and convincing evidence standard
otherwise utilized for applicable collateral review claims).
239. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596 (West 2000); 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1999).
240. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992); Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Jenkins, 498 S.E.2d at 516-19 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting); Williams, 831
So. 2d at 859-60; Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1015-16; Bing, supra note 54, at 144-45; Implementing Atkins, supra
note 103, at 2586 n.132; Raines, supra note 103, at 199-200; Shannon, supra note 161, at 831-34; Ellis, supra
note 116, at 15 (providing support for recommendation, directly or indirectly). But see Ellis, supra note 116, at
16-17 (suggesting government burden to prove absence of mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt may
be required by Ring).
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to establish it, and its clear mitigating character, it is permissible to assign the defendant
the burden of proving facts that will exempt him from execution. 24'
However, the standard of proof should be no higher than preponderance of the evi-
dence, for several reasons. First, this standard is consistent with the historical treatment
of evidentiary standards pertaining to related mental health issues, as described in Coo-
per. This standard is also consistent with the weight of the specific contemporary prac-
tice regarding the implementation of the Atkins constitutional exemption, especially by
post-Atkins states. Moreover, a proof standard higher than preponderance of the evi-
dence would unacceptably increase the risk of error in the mental retardation determina-
tion by allowing someone who is "more likely than not" mentally retarded to neverthe-
less be deemed eligible for the death penalty, in violation of the Atkins constitutional
ban. As in Cooper, the preponderance of the evidence proof standard appropriately allo-
cates the risk of error, recognizing that the consequences to the defendant from an erro-
neous determination (i.e., death penalty eligibility) significantly outweigh the conse-
quences to the government (i.e., generally limitation of punishment to life imprison-
ment). As a result, the defendant should not be allocated the "larger share" of the risk of
error in the mental retardation determination that would accompany a standard of proof
higher than preponderance of the evidence. Finally, this standard of proof is necessary to
adequately safeguard the important constitutional right being protected (i.e., the consti-
tutional exclusion of mentally retarded offenders from execution). Just as the unanimous
Court concluded in Cooper regarding the competency determination, the standard of
proof regarding mental retardation for Atkins purposes should be no higher than prepon-
derance of the evidence.242 This standard will not only provide the necessary reliability
to protect the constitutional right at issue, but will also further the "clear need for trust-
worthiness in any factual finding that will prevent or permit [a defendant's constitutional
exclusion from execution]. 243
VI. POST-CONVICTION REVIEW OF ATKINS CLAIMS
Of the approximately 3,500 offenders currently under sentence of death in this
country, estimates of the proportion who are mentally retarded range between 4% and
20%,24 or approximately 140 to 700 offenders. Thus, the retroactivity of the Atkins ban
on the execution of mentally retarded offenders represents a critical issue for a signifi-
cant number of capital offenders currently awaiting execution. Only a few of the eight-
een pre-Atkins states had made their statutory bans retroactive. Most of the pre-Atkins
states had either expressly applied their ban statutes prospectively or were silent on the
issue.245 Of course, the twenty capital punishment states without bans prior to Atkins had
no specific provisions for the post-conviction review of the mental retardation issue.
241. See supra notes 213-35 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 213-39 and accompanying text.
243. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 413, 418 (1986) (plurality opinion).
244. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
245. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2005, -2006
(2002) (providing retroactive application for claims filed within prescribed time period), with, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Supp. 2003) (providing pro-
spective application), and, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030
(West 2002) (omitting reference to retroactivity). Cf. Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989); Van Tran v.
State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) (providing for retroactive application of holding that execution of mentally
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Although the Atkins decision did not expressly include a retroactivity discussion,
such a discussion was not necessary because the Court had previously unanimously
addressed the retroactive application of a constitutional ban on the execution of mentally
retarded offenders in its resolution of the Penry case. Penry's claim had reached the
Court through the collateral review process. Therefore, as a threshold matter, the Court
had to determine whether Penry's claim sought a "new rule," the announcement and
application of which the Court had previously significantly restricted in collateral re-
view cases. The Court determined that the holding Penry sought would indeed require
the establishment of a "new rule," not dictated by precedent at the time Penry's convic-
tion became final and imposing a new obligation on the states and federal government.
Nevertheless, the Court unanimously determined that Penry's claim could be considered
and applied retroactively to defendants on collateral review because it satisfied one of
the exceptions to the nonretroactivity doctrine which the Court had recognized, i.e., the
ruling would constitutionally prohibit a category of punishment for a class of defendants
based on their status or offense.246 Although the Penry Court declined to establish the
requested constitutional ban, the unanimous Court's retroactivity conclusion regarding
the execution exclusion itself applies to the constitutional ban the Court ultimately rec-
ognized in Atkins.
2 47
Thus, mentally retarded offenders sentenced to death in states without statutory or
judicial ban procedures, in states in which they were sentenced prior to the enactment or
implementation of such procedures, and, presumably, in states with procedures insuffi-
cient to address (or incorrectly applied to) the category of mentally retarded offenders
excluded from execution by Atkins, may be able to present claims regarding their mental
retardation on collateral review-both through state and federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings.248 It is therefore important for states (and the federal justice system) to adopt ap-
propriate collateral review mechanisms to make the mental retardation determination in
applicable cases. This section reviews how the states and federal courts have addressed
the post-conviction review of Atkins claims before making recommendations in this
regard.
retarded offenders violates state constitution).
246. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. Because the Atkins case reached the Court through the
direct appeal process rather than through collateral review, the Court could announce its "new rule" without
referencing this retroactivity analysis as a threshold matter, as had been required in Penry.
247. As one Justice noted during the Atkins oral argument, "Maybe the States that haven't made it retroac-
tive haven't gotten up to speed on that once it's- once we make a declaration of unconstitutionality, it's retro-
spective." Oral Argument at 42, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452); see Ellis, supra note
116, at 17. Federal and state courts that have addressed the issue, including those in states which had enacted
prospective ban statutes, have acknowledged the retroactive application of the Atkins holding constitutionally
excluding mentally retarded offenders from execution. Compare, e.g., Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332 (5th
Cir. 2002); Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (reflecting federal court interpretation), with,
e.g., State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 851 n.21 (La. 2002); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ohio
2002) (reflecting interpretation of states without pre-Atkins bans), and, e.g., State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234, 1240-
41 (Ariz. 2003); Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535, 539 n. 12 (Mo. 2003) (applying Atkins retroactively despite
prospective only state bans).
248. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. Because Atkins established a federal constitutional prohi-
bition of the execution of mentally retarded offenders, this prohibition is enforceable by state capital offenders
through federal as well as state habeas corpus proceedings. See infra notes 279-301 and accompanying text.
Although this section principally addresses the collateral review process, many of the principles discussed also
apply to post-conviction cases still in the direct review process. See, e.g., infra notes 253-54, 262-64 and




A. State Post-Conviction Review of Atkins Claims
In the period since the Atkins ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders
was announced, states have begun to address a variety of issues related to the post-
conviction review of Atkins claims. These issues include threshold considerations of an
offender's potential procedural default or waiver of his Atkins claim due to the failure to
adequately raise the claim previously or the potential limitation on the raising of an At-
kins claim through a successive habeas corpus petition.149 Assuming an offender is pro-
cedurally able to raise an Atkins claim on collateral review, there may be additional
threshold evidentiary standards that must be satisfied prior to obtaining review. With the
satisfaction of any preliminary evidentiary showing, issues remain concerning the scope
of the hearing provided and the nature of the mental retardation determination on collat-
eral review.
State courts that have thus far addressed potential procedural default and successive
petition obstacles to Atkins claims have tended to overcome these obstacles, often find-
ing that the Atkins ruling satisfies an exception to these bars to collateral review.2 50 In
this connection, Georgia, the state with the oldest statutory ban and a ban pursuant to its
state constitution of almost the same duration, has had the longest experience with po-
tentially defaulted claims. The Georgia Supreme Court has held that a mental retardation
claim can be made for the first time in a habeas corpus petition pursuant to the "miscar-
riage of justice" exception to its procedural default principle.2z ' Similarly, the Ohio Su-
preme Court concluded that the Atkins decision satisfies an exception to its statutory
restriction on successive habeas corpus petitions, i.e., Court decisions recognizing a new
federal right that applies retroactively to persons asserting the claim in a successive
petition. 252 The same analysis which resulted in the Penry Court's retroactivity holding
seems likely to permit Atkins claims to avoid procedural default and successive petition
bars to collateral review.
253
249. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1151-56 (2d ed. 1992)
(regarding state writs).
250. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 841 So. 2d 768 (La. 2003) (addressing Atkins issue raised for the first time
in post-conviction proceedings); Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172, 175 (Miss. 2003) (finding that Atkins is an
"intervening decision" that renders timeliness and successive application bars inapplicable); cf Bradford v.
Cockrell, No. 3:00-CV-2709-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21898, at *3,10 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2002, as corrected
Jan. 14, 2003) (noting state concession that offender would be able to assert Atkins claim through successive
petition under state law). But see Foster, 848 So. 2d at 176 (Smith, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (finding the Atkins claim procedurally barred and that Atkins does not satisfy the "intervening decision"
exception).
251. See Head v. Ferrell, 554 S.E.2d 155, 166 (Ga. 2001); Turpin v. Hill, 498 S.E.2d 52, 53 (Ga. 1998); see
also Rogers v. State, 575 S.E.2d 879, 881 (Ga. 2003) (stating that adjudication of mental retardation to deter-
mine death penalty eligibility is constitutionally required whenever it is challenged or otherwise in question).
252. See State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 101 I, 1014-15 (Ohio 2002).
253. At least two states, however, have taken a somewhat narrower view regarding these threshold issues.
Although avoiding a waiver finding in the case before it, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has re-
quired that the mental retardation issue have been preserved in previously tried cases in at least one of several
specified ways at trial or by prior appeal or collateral review. See Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 566, 569
(Okla. Crim. App. 2002). But see id. at 575 (Chapel, J., concurring in result) (finding majority's issue preser-
vation dicta contrary to "plain language" of state collateral review statute, not compliant with the "letter or
spirit" of Atkins or the legislature's will, and unlikely to survive constitutional challenge in federal court); id. at
572 (Johnson, V.P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that Atkins claims not subject to
waiver doctrine).
In addition, in its post-Atkins ban statute, Virginia limits the raising of an Atkins claim by offenders
sentenced to death before the effective date of the legislation. It allows the presentation of this claim by of-
fenders still eligible for or involved in the direct appeal or collateral review processes. However, if an offender
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Even though Atkins claims are not likely to be procedurally barred from all consid-
eration on collateral review, most states have declined to require full collateral review of
an Atkins claim without some preliminary showing of a factual basis for the claim. As
one state supreme court noted, "We hasten to point out that not everyone faced with a
death penalty sentence will automatically be entitled to a post-Atkins hearing. It will be
an individual defendant's burden to provide objective factors that will put at issue the
fact of mental retardation." 254 Some courts have implemented predicate statutory eviden-
tiary requirements also stated in general terms, including a demonstration that the claim
is "not frivolous" 255 or that there is a "substantial showing that a defendant's constitu-
tional rights have been violated., 256 Other courts have further identified the predicate
evidentiary requirements concerning a mental retardation claim by requiring "sufficient
credible evidence" that includes at least one expert diagnosis of mental retardation 257 or
258a "prima facie" showing of all three components of the mental retardation definition.
Thus, it appears that some type of predicate showing reflecting a factual basis for an
Atkins claim will be required before a more complete evidentiary determination is au-
thorized on collateral review.
2 5 9
Assuming that such a showing is made, most reviewing courts have then authorized
an evidentiary hearing with a de novo determination of mental retardation in instances in
which no such determination has previously been made. 260 This procedure is consistent
with the remand for a de novo evidentiary determination of "competence to be executed"
which the Court ordered following its recognition of the constitutional prohibition of the
execution of insane offenders in Ford v. Wainwright.261 Interestingly, the Virginia Su-
preme Court, upon receiving the remand of Atkins' case from the Court, recognized the
procedural similarity of the remanded case to that in Ford. This reviewing court noted
has completed these processes prior to the enactment of the state ban legislation, he is not entitled to file any
additional state habeas corpus petitions and his "sole remedy shall lie in federal court." VA. CODE ANN. §§
8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to : 1.2 (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess.).
254. State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 857 (La. 2002) (requiring evidentiary hearing in direct appeal case
and quoted in part in Edwards, 841 So. 2d at 768, a collateral review case).
255. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 514, 517 (Va. 2003) (applying the standard stated in post-
Atkins ban statute, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to :1.2 (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Reg.
Sess.)).
256. People v. Pulliam, 794 N.E.2d 214, 224-25 (I11. 2002) (applying evidentiary standard from state col-
lateral review statute).
257. See Rogers v. State, 575 S.E.2d 879, 881 (Ga. 2003); Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342 (Ga.
1989).
258. See Murphy v. State, 66 P.3d 456, 458 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). But see id. at 461 (Johnson, P.J.,
specially concurring) (requiring prima facie showing regarding any of three components to trigger evidentiary
hearing); id. at 462 (Chapel, J., dissenting) (requiring prima facie showing regarding any of the three compo-
nents).
259. Compare Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 148 (Miss. 2003) (finding that conflicting record evidence of
mental retardation warranted post-conviction evidentiary hearing), with State v. Tate, 851 So. 2d 921, 942 (La.
2003) (finding insufficient record evidence to warrant post-conviction evidentiary hearing based on defense
expert testimony that defendant is not mentally retarded).
260. See, e.g., Wood v. State, No. CR-01-0700, 2003 Ala. Crim. App. 115, at * 27-28 (Ala. Crim. App.
Apr. 25, 2003); Pulliam,794 N.E.2d at 236-37; Russell, 849 So. 2d at 149; Murphy, 54 P.3d at 570. But see,
e.g., Fairchild v. Norris, 876 S.W.2d 588, 589-91 (Ark. 1994) (finding no right to evidentiary hearing pursuant
to state ban because of prior determination of lack of mental retardation in context of Miranda waiver issue);
but cf, e.g., Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002, as corrected 2003) (rejecting remand for resen-
tencing in direct appeal case because trial record evidence did not "create any inference" of mental retarda-
tion), cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6155 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2003).
261. See 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986) (plurality opinion); id. at 423-25, 427 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (finding federal de novo evidentiary determination on collateral review necessary
because of inadequacy of state determination of issue).
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that conflicting evidence of mental retardation in the record had been considered by the
jury in connection with its mitigating evidence determination during sentencing, by the
state supreme court itself in conducting its proportionality review on appeal, and by the
Court in ultimately fashioning its constitutional holding. However, the court concluded
that the "controverted factual question" whether Atkins is mentally retarded had never
been "resolved" in any of these proceedings. Finding that the mental retardation issue
had been sufficiently raised to warrant further proceedings, the state supreme court re-
manded the Atkins case for a de novo hearing on the "sole issue" of Atkins' mental re-
tardation, pursuant to the state's post-Atkins statutory ban procedures.262
Similarly, other reviewing courts have authorized such a de novo proceeding even
in circumstances in which there has been a fair amount of evidence concerning mental
retardation in the trial record. In determining that a post-conviction evidentiary hearing
was required to determine the offender's mental retardation, despite the presence of
evidence regarding mental retardation in the record, the Louisiana Supreme Court sum-
marized the rationale for authorizing a de novo proceeding in such circumstances.
The United States Supreme Court [in Atkins] essentially altered the rules and al-
tered a relevant fact after the trial. The State and the defense are both put in the im-
possible position of arguing whether a fact was established-i.e., whether the defen-
dant is mentally retarded-when that fact was simply not an issue which a fact finder
was called upon to decide. A fact that was marginally relevant when this case was
tried (whether the defendant is mentally retarded) became a fact which could deter-
mine the sentence to be imposed after the trial. The State and defense gallantly at-
tempt to argue from this record; however, their efforts must fail because the signifi-
cance of the issue of mental retardation was drastically changed after the trial as a re-
sult of Atkins. The relevance of whether or not this defendant is mentally retarded has
increased exponentially. Neither the State nor defense was required to anticipate this
change.
The defense was not called upon to exert time, energy, and effort in marshaling
proof of mental retardation at the trial. Defendant needed only to establish diminished
capacity as a mitigating factor. There was no obligation to prove mental retardation,
which after the trial became a bar to the death penalty. Nevertheless, although the de-
fendant was not called upon to offer proof of mental retardation, the defendant did of-
fer evidence of mental retardation.
It would be patently unjust to conclude from this record that the defendant failed to
prove a fact which the defense was not called upon to prove at the time of the trial.
Because the burden of proof of establishing mental retardation is imposed on the de-
fendant [under the state's post-Atkins procedure], the defendant must be afforded the
opportunity to meet that burden in a case such as this in which an expert testified
without contradiction [the offender] is mentally retarded and his IQ is very close to
262. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 514 (Va. 2003). Although the Atkins remand involves a
post-sentencing mental retardation determination during the direct appeal process, the court's own comparison
to the Ford collateral review case reflects the applicability of its conclusion regarding the necessity of a de
novo mental retardation determination to such a determination during the collateral review process.
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that which would indicate mental retardation. We reiterate that a defendant is not enti-
tled to a post-Atkins hearing regarding mental retardation merely upon request.
Furthermore, neither the State nor the defendant had any guidance as to the proper
definition, criteria, and procedure to utilize in determining when one is mentally re-
tarded such that the death penalty could not be imposed. Based on the record in this
case, this court lacks sufficient factual evidence to make the legal determination of
whether or not the defendant is mentally retarded. This factual/legal determination
must be made following a hearing during which the court will be guided by evalua-
tion and diagnosis made by those with expertise in diagnosing mental retardation.
263
Applying this rationale explicitly or implicitly, reviewing courts have tended to grant de
novo evidentiary hearings regarding the mental retardation determination after the estab-
lishment of the predicate factual basis.
26 4
Once a court has authorized an evidentiary hearing regarding mental retardation on
collateral review, 265 the mental retardation determination itself is generally made using
the same definition of mental retardation as if the determination were being made during
the trial process. With respect to the identification of the fact finder and burden and
standard of proof, states that have addressed the issue have either adopted the same or a
modified version of the procedures used in the trial phase determination of mental retar-
dation, or have adopted the procedures in their applicable general collateral review pro-
266visions.
Only four of the pre-Atkins states had statutory provisions or judicial rulings that
authorized and addressed the retroactive application of their state bans on the execution
of mentally retarded offenders. Both Nebraska and North Carolina authorized offenders
sentenced to death prior to the enactment of their statutory bans to raise the mental re-
tardation issue through a motion filed within a prescribed time period following the
effective date of their statutes. 267 The Nebraska procedure used the same mental retarda-
263. State v. Dunn, 831 So. 2d 862, 886-87 (La. 2002) (noting the above in a direct appeal case tried before
Atkins and the adoption of the state's post-Atkins ban procedure); see State v. Dunn, 847 So. 2d 1183, 1183
(La. 2003) (finding that predicate showing of mental retardation had been satisfied and ordering evidentiary
hearing regarding mental retardation).
264. See Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Mo. 2003); State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 101l, 1015 (Ohio
2002) (articulating similar considerations in authorizing evidentiary hearings in collateral review cases); see
also State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234, 1239-41 (Ariz. 2003) (noting similar rationale in direct appeal case); supra
note 260 (citing additional cases concerning the authorization of a de novo evidentiary hearing).
265. Despite the tendency of reviewing courts to authorize such evidentiary hearings, these courts have
engaged in little discussion concerning the general procedural safeguards accompanying these collateral pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., Zant v. Foster, 406 S.E.2d 74, 76 (Ga. 1991) (requiring appointed counsel and other trial-
related rights during collateral review of mental retardation for state constitutional ban purposes); Lambert v.
State, 71 P.3d 30, 31-32 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (applying trial-related rights and describing other hearing
procedures). Presumably, the procedural protections that apply to collateral review of state capital cases gener-
ally apply to these evidentiary hearings regarding mental retardation. In this context, one procedural protection
of particular note is whether the applicable state collateral review procedure provides for appointment of an
attorney for an indigent offender. If such an offender has counsel during state habeas corpus proceedings
appointed pursuant to an appointment system that meets specified criteria, more restrictive federal habeas
corpus provisions apply. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266 (West Supp. 2003).
266. See infra notes 267-77 and accompanying text.
267. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2001 Cum. Supp.), amended by NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01
(2003 Cum. Supp.) (allowing verified motions brought within 120 days of the statute's July 15, 1998, effective
date); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2005, -2006 (2002) (allowing motions filed within 120 days of the statute's
October I, 2001, effective date or within 120 days of the imposition of a death sentence for a trial in progress
on that date and expressly expiring October I, 2002). Both of these time periods regarding the state statutory
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tion definition, fact finder, and proof requirements for its collateral review hearing as for
its trial phase determination.2 68 The North Carolina post-conviction statute adopted the
same mental retardation definition as the trial phase statute, but incorporated the proce-
dural and hearing provisions of its general "motion for appropriate relief' process. This
resulted in a collateral proceeding in which the court determined mental retardation and
in which the defendant had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. This
varied from the statutory pretrial court determination based on defendant proof by clear
and convincing evidence with the opportunity for a jury de novo determination based on
defendant proof by the preponderance standard.269
In implementing their state constitutional bans on the execution of mentally re-
tarded offenders, the Georgia and Tennessee Supreme Courts prescribed collateral re-
view procedures for their bans' retroactive application. The non-time limited Georgia
process adopted the definitional and defendant proof burden of the statutory trial phase
procedure, but adopted a preponderance proof standard rather than the statutory beyond
a reasonable doubt standard and required (rather than authorized) jury fact finding.27 °
Using the definitional provisions of its statutory ban, the prescribed Tennessee collateral
process incorporated its "motion to reopen" collateral review procedures. 27 1
Supreme courts in two additional pre-Atkins states have authorized post-conviction
evidentiary hearings to determine mental retardation following Atkins. The Arizona
Supreme Court instructed the trial court on remand to use Atkins "as a guide" and to
follow the state's statutory ban procedures (enacted after this offender's sentencing) to
the degree possible in the "post-trial posture" of the case.272 After noting the prospective
nature of its statutory ban, the Missouri Supreme Court stated, "Nonetheless, in light of
Atkins, this Court holds as a bright-line test that a defendant that can prove mental retar-
dation by a preponderance of the evidence, as set out in [the statutory ban procedure],
shall not be subject to the death penalty.,
273
Not surprisingly, most of the states that have enacted statutory or adopted judicial
ban procedures since Atkins have addressed the post-conviction consideration of Atkins
claims of mental retardation.274 In their statutory provisions, three states have required
bans have obviously expired. The question remains whether their expiration would preclude collateral claims
pursuant to the Atkins federal constitutional ban. Language in the current version of the Nebraska statute,
amended after Atkins, indicates that a capital offender sentenced after the statute's effective date could seek a
mental retardation determination prior to any subsequent sentencing hearing. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
105.01 (2003 Cum. Supp.).
268. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (2001 Cum. Supp.), amended by NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01
(2003 Cum. Supp.).
269. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1420, -2005, -2006 (2002); State v. Walters, 561 S.E.2d 892 (N.C.
2002) (allowing motion for appropriate relief and ordering remand to trial court for determination of mental
retardation).
270. See Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342-43 (Ga. 1989); see also Rogers v. State, 575 S.E.2d 879,
881-82 (Ga. 2003); Zant v. Foster, 406 S.E.2d 74, 76 (Ga. 1991).
27 1. See Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 794, 811-12 (Tenn. 2001) (providing for trial court hearing and
defendant proof of allegations, but also including a one-year filing period from the date of the ruling establish-
ing the constitutional right). The Atkins ruling might create an additional time period for filing these claims.
272. See State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Ariz. 2003).
273. Johnson v. State, 102 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Mo. 2003). The reviewing court remanded the case for a "new
penalty phase hearing." The court's language left unclear whether the statutory opportunity for the trial court to
resolve the issue would be available, as well as a de novo determination of an adverse finding by the jury
during a punishment phase proceeding. The standard of proof in the court's opinion is the same as in the stat-
ute. See id. at 541; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp. 2003).
274. Cf Act of June 27, 2003, 2003 La. Act 698, 2003 La. HB 1017 (to be codified at LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1) (omitting collateral procedure in statute, but procedure provided in state supreme
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that their trial phase procedures regarding the mental retardation determination be used
in post-conviction determinations. 275 In their statutes, two states have generally incorpo-
rated the procedures of their applicable post-conviction remedies for any mental retarda-
tion collateral review.276 The highest appellate courts in four states have adopted the
definitional and procedural provisions described previously in this Article in the context
of the resolution of a post-conviction case or have otherwise indicated the application of
the adopted procedure to cases on collateral review.
277
Thus, at this point, only approximately fifteen (of the thirty-eight) capital punish-
ment states have significantly addressed the post-conviction procedures that will be
required to determine mental retardation for Atkins purposes. These states have gener-
ally demonstrated a willingness to consider Atkins claims on collateral review, finding
exceptions to otherwise applicable procedural bars and successive petition barriers.
However, the states have usually required a predicate showing of a factual basis for a
mental retardation claim before authorizing an evidentiary hearing on the claim. Once
this showing has been made, most states that have addressed the matter have authorized
a de novo evidentiary determination of mental retardation. In this evidentiary proceed-
ing, courts either use the trial phase procedures for determining mental retardation or the
procedures generally applicable to post-conviction relief in the state.278
B. Federal Collateral Review of Atkins Claims
Mentally retarded state offenders not only have a potential Atkins claim which can
be pursued through state habeas corpus proceedings, but they also have a potential claim
that can be addressed through federal habeas corpus review. 279 Because the Atkins claim
court decision described infra note 277 and accompanying text). But see UTAH CODEANN. §§ 77-15a-101 to -
106, 77-18a-I (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.) (omitting collateral procedure).
275. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.I 1, § 4209 (Supp. 2002) (requiring use in all cases "tried, re-tried, sentenced,
or re-sentenced" after statute's effective date); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to :1.2 (Michie,
LEXIS through 2003 Reg. Sess.) (requiring use in available post-conviction proceedings); Act of May 21,
2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015,
177.055, 200.030) (requiring use in motions to set aside penalty if no prior determination of mental retardation
has been made under statute).
276. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS through 2003 Sess.) (incorporating general procedures
and time limits regarding capital cases); Act of Nov. 19, 2003, 2003 III. SB 472 (to be codified at 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/114-15, 5/122-2.2) (adopting statutory definitional provision, requiring petition's filing within
180 days of statute's effective date or of supreme court's mandate setting execution date, and otherwise adopt-
ing general post-conviction relief procedures); cf People v. Pulliam, 794 N.E.2d 214, 237 (I1. 2002) (defer-
ring to legislature to adopt post-conviction procedure regarding mental retardation claims, leaving trial courts
without definitive guidance in the interim regarding procedures for these and pre-conviction claims, and re-
serving role to review all such cases for due process compliance).
277. See State v. Williams, 831 So. 2d 835, 851 n.21, 858 & n.33, 859-62 (La. 2002) (establishing interim
procedure with court fact finder, offender proof burden, and preponderance standard applicable to post-
conviction cases, which presumably still applies in the absence of superseding statutory post-conviction provi-
sions); Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172, 175 (Miss. 2003) (identifying post-conviction procedure); State v. Lott,
779 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-16 (Ohio 2002) (establishing pre- and post-conviction procedure and specifying lower
standard of proof for Atkins successive petition claims filed within 180 days of decision than available under
general post-conviction procedures); Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (establishing pre-
and post-conviction procedures); cf. Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002, as corrected 2003)
(identifying mental retardation definition for post-conviction review purposes), cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS
6155 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2003).
278. See supra notes 249-77 and accompanying text. This section describes the availability of and proce-
dural framework for state collateral review of Atkins claims. Appellate court review of the determination of
these claims on the merits is described in Section VII. of this Article.
279. This section addresses potential federal habeas corpus relief for state offenders, who represent the vast
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is premised on federal constitutional law, it satisfies a basic jurisdictional requirement
for federal habeas corpus relief regarding claims by state offenders. 280 However, state
prisoner access to federal habeas corpus relief has been severely restricted since the
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")2 8 in 1996.
The AEDPA provisions themselves, and as foreshadowed by and interpreted by the
Court, establish several barriers to state offenders seeking federal habeas corpus re-
lief.
28 2
At the outset, offenders must generally file their federal habeas corpus claims
within one year after the judgment being challenged becomes final on direct review.
This limitations period is tolled during the pendency of state post-conviction or collat-
eral proceedings regarding the claim and can be equitably tolled for other reasons.283
Prior to filing a claim for federal habeas corpus relief, state prisoners must fully exhaust
all available state remedies for redress of their claim. 2 84 If an offender fails to raise or
waives a claim at the state level such that it is deemed procedurally defaulted, federal
habeas corpus relief will generally not be afforded to the offender if the state ruling
constitutes an "adequate and independent" basis for resolution of the claim unless the
offender can establish "cause" for his failure to previously raise the claim and "preju-
dice" if the claim is not heard.285 Successive federal habeas corpus petitions are gener-
ally barred regarding the same claim unless an offender can establish that his initial
claim was dismissed on technical grounds (e.g., a failure to exhaust state claims).286
Successive habeas corpus petitions can be raised regarding different claims only if the
offender can establish "cause" for his failure to previously raise the claim and "preju-
dice" if the claim is not heard. In addition, the nature of claims cognizable on a succes-
sive petition is further restricted by the AEDPA.2 87
majority of capital offenders in this country. Of course, mentally retarded offenders who are prosecuted in the
federal criminal justice system also have access to federal habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West
Supp. 2003). Neither Congress nor the federal courts have thus far established any specific procedures to
address Atkins claims raised by federal prisoners through habeas corpus proceedings.
280. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241, 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
281. Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-107, Il0 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996).
282. See generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOGOBIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 968-1026 (4th ed. 2000) (describing federal habeas corpus).
283. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); see also Warren v. Lewis, 206 F. Supp. 2d 917,
920 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (describing equitable tolling). In the AEDPA, Congress also enacted special collateral
provisions in capital cases applicable to states which provide counsel (satisfying specified criteria) for capital
offenders in their state collateral proceedings. These provisions include a filing time period as short as 180
days from the applicable starting points. Thus far, few states have adopted appointed counsel systems that
qualify for the application of these provisions. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266 (West Supp. 2003); see also,
e.g., Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 603-05 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that state does not qualify for application
of these provisions).
284. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003). See generally Rodriguez v. Cockrell, Civ. No.
SA-00-CA-443-EP, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6408, at * 12-24 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2003) (describing exhaustion
requirements).
285. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-92
(1986).
286. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644-
46(1998).
287. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). An
offender seeking to file a successive habeas corpus petition must first seek approval in the applicable federal
appellate court and make a "prima facie" showing that he satisfies the AEDPA's filing requirements. Even if
the appellate court authorizes the filing, the trial court must also ensure that the statutory requirements have
been satisfied before addressing the merits of the claim. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
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Assuming a state offender overcomes these procedural barriers to federal habeas
corpus review, the review itself is limited to a determination whether the challenged
state court action was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law, as reflected in Court decisions, or whether the action was based
on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of evidence presented in the state
court proceeding. 288 As discussed in the Penry case, federal courts cannot establish "new
rules" of law through the collateral review process, unless they fall within narrow excep-
tions.289 In the resolution of a federal habeas corpus claim, state court factual findings
are presumed to be correct-unless the offender establishes otherwise by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The right to an evidentiary hearing is limited unless the offender can
establish specified grounds for the failure to develop facts in the state proceedings. Al-
though there is no federal constitutional right to appointed counsel regarding habeas
corpus proceedings, the AEDPA permits a federal court to appoint counsel for an indi-
gent offender.
290
As this brief description of the complex federal habeas corpus process makes clear,
state offenders pursuing Atkins claims through federal habeas corpus proceedings face
many procedural and substantive hurdles to obtaining federal court relief. Their pursuit
of such relief is aided by the fact that the Atkins Court's establishment of a "new rule" of
constitutional law which has retroactive application serves as an exception to some of
the described procedural bars to obtaining federal review. For example, the one-year
limitations period should run from the date of the Atkins decision, i.e., June 20, 2002.
Although this time period has now expired, an individual offender's limitation period
may have been tolled or could be extended for other reasons authorized under the
AEDPA, e.g., pursuit of post-Atkins state collateral relief. 291 In addition, the Atkins "new
rule" should also satisfy necessary "cause" and "prejudice" requirements to excuse a
procedural default or successive petition bar to federal relief, and may also make an
offender eligible for an evidentiary hearing on his claim. 292 Finally, an offender's claim
which attempts to establish his "actual innocence" is also an exception to the procedural
default bar. In the context of a death sentence, actual innocence includes a showing, by
clear and convincing evidence, of a circumstance that would render an offender ineligi-
ble for the death penalty.293 As a result of Atkins, such a showing of mental retardation
should qualify for this exception.294
Although several offenders have filed federal habeas corpus petitions asserting At-
kins claims, federal courts have thus far generally deferred to the states to address these
claims initially. One federal appellate court referred to the "welter of uncertainty" cre-
288. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-13 (2000);
cf. id. at 379-90 (plurality opinion).
289. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989) (applying Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-3 10
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
290. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); cf. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
291. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
292. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2244, 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003); cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
750(1991).
293. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); cf 28 U.S.C.A. § 2264 (West Supp. 2003) (omitting
actual innocence as an exception to the procedural default rules in the special capital provisions for eligible
states, as described in supra note 283).
294. An "actual innocence" claim exception also applies to the limitations on successive petitions and
evidentiary hearings if the factual predicate to the claim could not have been discovered "through the exercise
of due diligence." See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2244, 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
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ated by the Atkins decision as a result of its failure to "conclusively" define mental retar-
dation or to provide "guidance" as to its application to prisoners already sentenced to
death. As a result of the Court's delegation to the states of the establishment of appropri-
ate mechanisms to enforce the Atkins Court's holding,
[Ijnferior federal courts have no useful role to play until and unless following Atkins,
a death sentence is reaffirmed or again imposed on [the offender] by the state courts.
Just how the state courts will implement Atkins, we cannot say. Clearly, however, the
state must be given the first opportunity to apply the Supreme Court's holding in order
to insure consistency among state institutions and procedures and to adjust its prose-
cutorial strategy to the hitherto unforeseen new rule.
295
Implementing this sentiment, as well as the AEDPA exhaustion requirements, several
federal courts have dismissed Atkins claims without prejudice so that offenders can pur-
sue initial relief on these claims through the state courts.296
On the other hand, a few appellate courts have authorized the filing of successive
habeas corpus petitions that raise Atkins claims. 297 In these cases, the courts have con-
cluded that the Atkins ruling satisfies the exception to the successive petition bar for
previously unavailable "new" rules of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on
collateral review. Based on the materials submitted in support of the application, these
courts have also been able to determine that the offender has made a "prima facie" or
"sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district
court., 298 As one court stated with regard to Atkins claims,
[G]iven the Supreme Court's recent flat prohibition against executing the mentally re-
tarded, [we] hold that if petitioner's proofs, when measured against the entire record
in this case, establish a reasonable likelihood that he is in fact mentally retarded, then
we are required to grant him leave to file a second or successive habeas petition on
the basis of Atkins.
299
295. Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2002); see Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th
Cir. 2002); cf Walker v. True, 67 Fed. Appx. 758, 770-71 (4th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging appropriateness of
allowing states to resolve Atkins claims prior to federal courts).
296. See, e.g., Thompson v. Crosby, 320 F.3d 1228, 1229-30 (11 th Cir. 2003); Hill, 300 F.3d at 683; Brad-
ford v. Cockrell, No. 3:00-CV-2709-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21898, at *1- 12 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2002, as
corrected Jan. 14, 2003); see also Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 685 (5th Cir. 2002) (declining to address
unexhausted Atkins claim raised for the first time on appeal); cf Tennard v. Cockrell, 317 F.3d 476, 477 (5th
Cir. 2003) (declining to address Atkins claim unless raised by the offender).
A few courts that have dismissed Atkins claims on exhaustion grounds have addressed concerns about
the potential expiration of the applicable limitations period prior to offenders' completion of the state process
and return to federal court. One court noted that the limitations period for filing an Atkins claim would expire
one year after the decision, but would be tolled during the pendency of any state court post-conviction or
collateral proceeding. See Bradford, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21898, at *10 n.7 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244
(West 1994 & Supp. 2003)). Another court referred to the doctrine of "equitable" tolling to avoid any "perni-
cious" results from application of the exhaustion principles. See Rodriguez v. Cockrell, Civ. No. SA-00-CA-
443-EP, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6408, at *28 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2003).
297. See Walker, 67 Fed. Appx. at 770-7 1; In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2003). But see In
re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 404-05 (5th Cir. 2003).
298. See In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1173 (1 Ith Cir. 2003) (quoting Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d
468,469 (7th Cir. 1997)); cf Walker, 67 Fed. Appx. at 771 n. 10 (finding that appellate court need not consider
factual predicate of claim to address authorization motion to file successive petition)
299. Holladay, 331 F.3d at 1174.
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Under the AEDPA, the granting by an appellate court of authorization to an offender to
file his successive claim simply permits the filing to undergo a second procedural re-
view by a federal trial court before it addresses the merits of the claim. 3°°
These initial post-Atkins cases provide an indication of the manner in which federal
courts will likely address the filing of Atkins claims. It appears that federal courts will
require state offenders to exhaust their available state court remedies before seeking
federal habeas corpus relief. It also appears that the Atkins ruling will qualify as the type
of "new rule" which will serve as an exception to the successive petition bar, and pre-
sumably any "cause" and "prejudice" requirements. Some predicate showing of mental
retardation will likely be required for the filing of a successive petition, with a higher
degree of proof required to successfully challenge any state court factual determination
concerning mental retardation, legal application of Atkins, or substantiation of a claim of
"'actual innocence' of the death sentence" based on mental retardation. Given the status
of federal court collateral review of Atkins claims thus far, the manner in which the fed-
eral courts will ultimately determine these claims on the merits remains to be seen.3 °'
C. Recommendations Regarding Post-Conviction Review of Atkins Claims
At the outset, it is recommended that state legislatures codify their post-conviction
and collateral review procedures regarding offenders for whom no previous mental re-
tardation determination for Atkins purposes has been made.30 2 Such legislation will pro-
vide guidance to trial courts and help ensure consistency in appellate review. 30 3 In this
regard, states should incorporate as many of the procedures utilized in the substantive
trial phase determination of mental retardation as are applicable in a post-conviction
context, e.g., the mental retardation definition itself, the identification of the fact finder,
and the selection of the burden of proof and standard of proof.
3°4
From a procedural standpoint, states may be able to incorporate the provisions of
their general post-conviction and collateral review statutes if they offer an adequate
framework for implementing the Atkins constitutional ban on execution, but certain
aspects of the Atkins claim may require separate procedural provisions.30 5 The first deci-
sion that a state must make is whether to establish a limitations period for the filing of
an Atkins claim on collateral review. Although Georgia appears to have no time limits in
this regard, °6 state interests in finality support the establishment of a reasonable limita-
tions period. Given the uncertainty over the implementation of the Atkins mandate,
states should select a statutory limitations period for the filing of Atkins claims that runs
300. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003).
301. See supra notes 279-300 and accompanying text.
302. These offenders could include mentally retarded offenders sentenced to death in states without statu-
tory or judicial procedures to determine mental retardation, in states in which they were sentenced to death
before the enactment or implementation of such procedures, and, potentially, in states with procedures insuffi-
cient to address (or incorrectly applied to) the category of mentally retarded offenders excluded from execu-
tion by Atkins. For offenders who have received a trial phase mental retardation determination, pursuant to a
procedure which is adequate for Atkins purposes, presumably a state's regular collateral review procedures
would apply.
303. See generally Ellis, supra note 116, at 17-19 (suggesting the adoption of post-conviction procedures
for Atkins claims).
304. See supra notes 268, 272, 275, 277 and accompanying text (describing states that have adopted this
approach).
305. See supra notes 269, 276 and accompanying text (describing states that have used this approach).
306. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing Georgia collateral review procedure).
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from the enactment of the collateral review provisions rather than from the date of the
Atkins decision. In order to provide an adequate opportunity for an offender to raise an
Atkins claim, the limitations period should be no shorter than six months and need be no
307longer than one year.
If the Atkins ruling itself does not otherwise satisfy exceptions to any applicable
state procedural bar or successive petition restrictions, such restrictions should be
waived for Atkins claims in circumstances in which there has been no prior mental retar-
dation determination or opportunity for such. 30 8 Although there should be no automatic
right to an evidentiary post-conviction hearing regarding mental retardation, any predi-
cate evidentiary requirements should be reasonable, e.g., permitting the use of record
evidence or affidavits to establish a factual basis for the claim.309 Once an offender is
able to make such a predicate showing of mental retardation, he should be entitled to a
de novo evidentiary hearing in which his Atkins claim of mental retardation can be de-
termined. As appellate courts have noted, Atkins "altered the rules" regarding and the
importance of the mental retardation determination. Therefore, post-conviction review
courts should not make mental retardation determinations for death sentence eligibility
purposes on incomplete record evidence of mental retardation, especially if it was of-
fered and argued for other purposes at trial.3t ° Expert assistance, comparable to that
available for a trial phase mental retardation determination or required pursuant to Ake,
should be available. Finally, indigent offenders should have the statutory right to ap-
pointed counsel for these proceedings.3 '
These recommended procedures may be more extensive than a state's general post-
conviction and collateral review procedures. However, the Atkins Court's directive that
the states develop "appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their]
execution of sentences"312 applies to the post-conviction stages as well as the trial phase
of the proceedings. The recommended post-conviction and collateral procedures are
necessary to implement the constitutional prohibition of the execution of mentally re-
tarded offenders. Moreover, an adequate state post-conviction review process to deter-
mine an Atkins claim is ultimately in a state's interest-the more complete the state court
process, the greater deference it will receive under the AEDPA upon federal collateral
review.31 3
307. Cf. Ellis, supra note 116, at 18; supra notes 267, 276 and accompanying text (describing limitations
period).
308. See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 265; see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-83 (1985). But see Gorby v. State,
819 So. 2d 664, 679-80 (Fla. 2002) (rejecting claim that offender was denied adequate resources to present
mental retardation claim in post-conviction proceeding). Again, a state's adoption of an appointed counsel
system that meets the federal criteria should make the state eligible for the more restrictive federal habeas
corpus provisions available in capital cases. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-2266 (West Supp. 2003).
312. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (citation omitted).
313. See supra notes 279-301 and accompanying text (describing federal collateral review generally and
regarding Atkins claims). As one federal court noted in responding to an offender's concerns about the poten-
tial adequacy of state procedures to address Atkins claims,
[Tihis Court is unwilling to conclude in advance that the state courts will refuse to develop ap-
propriate ways to enforce this constitutional restriction upon its [sic] execution of death sen-
tences. Even so, this does not preclude a subsequent review in this Court. Once a state has first
addressed this question, federal courts retain the power to determine if the manner in which it
has resolved such a claim comports with the requirements of due process.
Bradford v. Cockrell, No. 3:00-CV-2709-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21898, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2002, as
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VII. APPLICATION ISSUES AND OTHER CHALLENGES REGARDING ATKINS CLAIMS
Even as the substantive standards regarding the implementation of the constitutional
prohibition of the execution of mentally retarded offenders continue to develop, courts
are addressing a variety of application issues and other challenges concerning Atkins
claims. These include appellate court review of mental retardation determinations made
pursuant to Atkins or state statutory bans, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
concerning the investigation and presentation of mental retardation evidence, and vari-
ous other claimed application errors. In addition, some courts have addressed-and
likely will increasingly address--challenges to the substantive state ban provisions
themselves. This section discusses these issues and predicts some likely trends.
A. Appellate Review of Mental Retardation Determinations
States have thus far provided for the appellate review of mental retardation determi-
nations made pursuant to Atkins or state bans in various ways. Some states have incor-
porated provisions concerning appeals of the mental retardation determination in their
statutory or judicial ban procedures. In this regard, two states authorize an interlocutory
appeal of a pretrial mental retardation determination by either the defendant or the
state.314 Six states expressly authorize the state to appeal a determination of a capital
defendant's mental retardation.315 One state provides for an appeal of the mental retarda-
tion determination by the defendant or state after sentencing.3 16 Two states include a
review of mental retardation generally or of the specific mental retardation determina-
tion in their mandatory appellate review provisions regarding capital cases.3 1 Of course,
even without express statutory authorization, appellate courts have reviewed offender
challenges to the sufficiency of adverse mental retardation determinations as part of the
311direct or post-conviction appellate review process.
In reviewing challenges to mental retardation determinations, appellate courts have
adopted various standards of review. 319 Courts have adopted standards which uphold
corrected Jan. 14, 2003) (citations omitted).
314. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat.
137, 2003 Nev. AB 15 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030).
315. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West Stipp. 2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney
Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.4 (Michie Supp. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a-101 to
-106, 77-18a-1 (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.); Act of Nov. 19, 2003, 2003 Ill. SB 472 (to be codified at
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-15, 5/122-2.2); State v. Dunn, 831 So. 2d 862, 888 n. I I (La. 2002) (depending on
the timing of the mental retardation determination in the particular state, this may be an interlocutory or post-
conviction or post-sentencing appeal).
316. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997).
317. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130 (West 2002); Act of May 21, 2003, 2003 Nev. Stat. 137,
2003 Nev. AB 15 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. 174, 175.554, 177.015, 177.055, 200.030); cf. Murphy v.
State, 54 P.3d 556, 569 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (permitting concerns about the mental retardation determina-
tion to be included as issues in the court's mandatory sentence review in death penalty cases and including the
court in other aspects of the mental retardation determination).
318. See, e.g., Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999).
319. A few state courts have also addressed whether and how they should consider mental retardation
claims raised for the first time on appeal, with varying results. Compare State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234, 1238-41
(Ariz. 2003) (considering previously unavailable Atkins claim and remanding for evidentiary hearing on men-
tal retardation), with Reams v. State, 909 S.W.2d 324, 326-27 (Ark. 1995) (declining to address constitutional
and statutory ban claims regarding mental retardation raised for the first time on appeal). As in the case of
post-Atkins post-conviction and collateral review challenges (see supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text),
state appellate courts will presumably be unlikely to assert waiver bars to mental retardation claims raised for
2003]
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mental retardation determinations if they are "supported by the record 320 or by "substan-
tial evidence 321 or unless they represent an abuse of discretion322 or are clearly errone-
ous.323 Utilizing such standards, appellate courts have thus far generally upheld chal-
lenged court (or jury) determinations that an offender is not mentally retarded under
324state provisions or the new constitutional exclusion from execution.
Of course, the cases that typically reach appellate courts for review of a mental re-
tardation determination are those in which the determination has been contested by the
state and the evidence is in dispute. For example, one state supreme court upheld a trial
court finding that the defendant was not mentally retarded in a case in which three of
four experts found the defendant had satisfied the intellectual functioning component of
the statutory mental retardation definition, but only one of the experts determined that
the defendant had satisfied the adaptive behavior component.325 In upholding a trial
court finding rejecting mental retardation in a case in which conflicting IQ scores of
sixty-six and seventy-two had been presented, another state supreme court stated, "We
reject [the defendant's] suggestion that the Trial Court was obligated to accept the score
of 66 over the score of 72 or to 'reduce' these scores by the possible three-point margin
of error or 'average' them together in some way." 326 Finally, as one state supreme court
succinctly summarized, "The ... court heard the evidence and chose to believe the tes-
the first time on appeal, at least regarding those claims previously unavailable to an offender under Atkins or a
state statutory ban.
320. See Bottoson v. State, 813 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 962 (2002).
321. See Rankin v. State, 948 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Ark. 1997).
322. See Rondon, 711 N.E.2d at 516.
323. See United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 352-53 (5th Cir. 1998); cf Murphy v. State, 66 P.3d 456,
458 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (using standard in upholding trial court determination that offender had not
established predicate showing of mental retardation to entitle him to full evidentiary hearing). In the absence
of a statutory ban, Alabama has been addressing Atkins claims raised for the first time on appeal with a "plain
error" standard of review. Utilizing this standard and the "most liberal" definitions of mental retardation, the
state appellate courts have reviewed the record regarding mental retardation evidence in such cases to deter-
mine whether to remand for an evidentiary hearing or resentencing. Compare Ex parte Smith, No. 1010267,
2003 Ala. LEXIS 79 (Ala. Mar. 14, 2003); Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002, as corrected 2003)
(finding record evidence does not support remand for resentencing), cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6155 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 2003), with Wood v. State, No. CR-01-0700, 2003 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 115 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr.
25, 2003) (remanding case for evidentiary hearing in light of erroneously excluded evidence and resultant
incomplete record regarding mental retardation).
324. See, e.g., Webster, 162 F.3d at 352-53; Bottoson, 813 So.2d at 33-34; Head v. Ferrell, 554 S.E.2d 155,
166-67 (Ga. 2001); Foster v. State, 525 S.E.2d 78, 79 (Ga. 2000); State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 918, 933
(Tenn. 1994); cf Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502, 512 (Ga. 1998) (upholding denial of directed verdict re-
garding mental retardation because evidence was disputed and conflicting). But cf Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d
68, 70-78 (Fla. 2002) (vacating death sentence because trial court rejected uncontroverted evidence of defen-
dant's borderline mental retardation in weighing capital punishment evidence, and noting enactment of pro-
spective legislative ban).
Appellate courts have also generally found record evidence of mental retardation insufficient to dis-
turb a death sentence when examined as part of a mandatory mental retardation, disproportionality, or inde-
pendent sentence review required in capital cases. See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 787 N.E.2d 1185, 1216-17 (Ohio
2003) (conducting independent sentence evaluation); Emmett v. Commonwealth, 569 S.E.2d 39, 47 n.2 (Va.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1586 (2003) (conducting proportionality and other mandatory review); State v.
Elledge, 26 P.3d 271, 284-85 (Wash. 2001) (conducting mandatory mental retardation review); cf State v.
Bone, 550 S.E.2d 482, 497-98 (N.C. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940 (2002) (finding record mental retarda-
tion evidence insufficient under proportionality review, but finding made without prejudice to pursuit of post-
conviction relief under new state ban statute); State v. Thomas, 779 N.E.2d 1017, 1037-39 (Ohio 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2295 (2003) (finding record evidence insufficient to disturb death sentence in sentence
review, but inviting offender to present additional evidence to satisfy Atkins standards in seeking post-
conviction relief).
325. See Rogers v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1172, 1176-81 (Ind. 1998).
326. Rankin, 948 S.W.2d at 404.
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timony of the State's expert rather than the testimony of [the defendant's] experts, and
found that [the defendant] is not mentally retarded. The... court did not abuse its dis-
cretion. '327 On the other hand, appellate courts have noted instances in which trial courts
have determined that a defendant is mentally retarded and have precluded the death
penalty as a sentencing option.
328
These appellate cases illustrate the importance of a complete evidentiary presenta-
tion regarding mental retardation-by both the defendant and the government-to en-
sure that the fact finder will have an adequate basis on which to make a mental retarda-
tion determination for Atkins purposes. Under the review standards adopted, appellate
courts are likely to give substantial deference to the mental retardation determinations
made.329
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Although there has been limited appellate and post-conviction scrutiny thus far, it
can be expected that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the investiga-
tion and presentation of mental retardation evidence for purposes of the Atkins ban will
increase. Moreover, given the independent constitutional status of these claims, they will
be subject to review both in state court proceedings and through federal collateral re-
view. 330 Although reviewing courts have not yet addressed many of these claims in the
post-Atkins context, the Court's general standards for such review were established al-
most twenty years ago in Strickland v. Washington:
33 1
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This re-
quires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the de-
fendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This re-
quires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
332
Further amplifying these standards, the Strickland Court noted that the alleged deficient
performance must fall below an "objective standard of reasonableness." The prejudice
component requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
333
Providing some guidance regarding the application of this stringent standard in the
Atkins context are two recent Court decisions finding counsel was constitutionally inef-
fective due to the failure to adequately investigate or present, inter alia, mitigating evi-
dence of mental retardation or deficiency in a capital case. In Williams v. Taylor,334 the
327. Rondon, 711 N.E.2d at 516.
328. See Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 766 & n.3 (Ind. 2002) (concerning offender with current intellec-
tual functioning of sixty-seven which was consistent with developmental period measurement); State v. Pow-
ell, 56 P.3d 189, 191 (Kan. 2002); Richardson v. State, 630 A.2d 238, 243 (Md. 1993) (omitting factual basis).
329. See supra notes 319-28 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 279-301 and accompanying text.
331. 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 688, 694.
334. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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Court identified counsel's failure to introduce available mitigating evidence that the
defendant was "borderline mentally retarded" as one of the factors that established coun-
sel's deficient performance and contributed to the prejudice the defendant suffered in the
resultant weighing of aggravating and mitigating capital punishment evidence.
3 5 Simi-
larly, in Wiggins v. Smith,336 the Court also identified counsel's failure to present miti-
gating evidence of the defendant's "diminished mental capacities," including IQ test
results of seventy-nine, as contributing to the prejudice the defendant suffered in the
weighing of capital punishment evidence.337 In this case, the Court rejected the proffered
justification that counsel's failure to investigate and present available mitigating evi-
dence represented a tactical judgment of trial strategy and reaffirmed the Strickland
standard in this regard:
Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plau-
sible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable profes-
sional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular deci-
sion not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circum-
stances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.
338
Although neither the Williams nor the Wiggins holding of ineffective assistance of
counsel was based solely on the omitted mental health evidence, the contributory role
that the failure to present this evidence played in the satisfaction of the stringent Strick-
land standard, especially applied in the context of limited federal collateral review, re-
flects the powerful effect such evidence can have in the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating capital punishment evidence. 339 In the future, when counsel's alleged defi-
cient performance in the investigation and presentation of mental retardation evidence is
considered in the context of an Atkins or statutory ban claim, the resulting prejudice
from any deficiency established should be even more apparent and any claimed justifi-
cation based on trial strategy less compelling.
340
335. See id. at 395-98.
336. 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
337. See id. at 2536, 2542-43.
338. Id. at 2535 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 ); see id. at 2535-36.
339. Compare Powell v. Collins, 328 F.3d 268, 290-94 (6th Cir. 2003); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043,
1067-75 (11 th Cir. 2002); Sanford v. State, 25 S.W.3d 414, 419-22 (Ark. 2000); Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d
506, 520-22 (Ind. 1999) (finding ineffective assistance claim established, inter alia, based on counsel's failure
to adequately investigate or present mitigating evidence of mental retardation or deficiency), with Hubbard v.
Haley, 317 F.3d 1245, 1260-61 (1 Ith Cir. 2003); Smith v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 661, 668-77 (5th Cir. 2002);
Cockrell v. Cockrell, Civ. No. SA-99-CA- I 19-FB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6433, at *62-72 (W.D. Tex. Mar.
31, 2003) (finding that counsel's failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence of mental retardation
either did not satisfy deficient performance or prejudice component of Strickland standard or both).
340. Courts have already begun to recognize the "particular significance" of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims regarding mental retardation evidence in light of Atkins. See Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1073; see also
Powell, 328 F.3d at 294. But see Smith, 311 F.3d at 664 (declining to consider Atkins claim raised for the first
time on appeal or to refer to it in ineffective assistance of counsel discussion). A federal trial judge considered
one of the few ineffective assistance claims directly related to an execution ban based on mental retardation. In
this collateral review case, the judge found "reasonable" the state court's determination that trial counsel was
not ineffective for not pursuing a mental retardation ban hearing for an offender and that the offender had not
shown prejudice by not having the hearing. Although the lawyer had scheduled the ban hearing, the offender
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C. Miscellaneous Application Errors
In addition to challenges to procedural and evidentiary sufficiency and counsel inef-
fectiveness, 34 1 offenders have alleged a variety of miscellaneous application errors in
their challenges of death sentences imposed despite the presentation of evidence of men-
tal retardation. For example, one reviewing court upheld a trial court's denial of a mo-
tion to change the venue of a mental retardation hearing, in the absence of an offender's
showing of prejudice from the hearing's location.342 This court also found no abuse of
discretion in the scope of the cross-examination of the defense expert permitted by the
trial court.343 Another appellate court found no error in the trial court's restriction of voir
dire questioning conceming whether potential jurors felt that a mentally retarded defen-
dant should get a harsher sentence than a defendant of "normal" intelligence. The defen-
dant had been allowed to ask relevant questions regarding bias toward mentally im-
paired persons, but the appellate court found that the challenged questioning was irrele-
vant because an offender found mentally retarded could not be executed pursuant to the
state ban and would automatically receive a sentence of life imprisonment.
344
On the other hand, one state supreme court found that the trial court had abused its
discretion by failing to grant a requested defense continuance to obtain an expert exami-
nation of a defendant who manifested evidence, inter alia, of mental retardation. Among
the factors that the appellate court considered in concluding that the trial court action
constituted reversible error was the fact that the results of the examination could be used
in determining whether the defendant was ineligible for the death penalty under the state
ban.4 5 Another state supreme court found that the trial court had abused its discretion by
refusing to admit testimony of proffered lay witnesses relating to the adaptive behavior
component of mental retardation. However, because the appellate court concluded that
the state's execution ban applied prospectively and did not apply to the defendant, the
reviewing court found that the error did not affect the defendant's "substantial" rights
and hence did not constitute reversible error.
346
The variety and number of these application error claims can be expected to in-
crease as the number of mental retardation determinations increases following Atkins. Of
course, these few cases do not establish a definitive trend regarding the manner in which
reviewing courts will address these application error claims. Once again, however, At-
kins has altered the dispositive nature of the mental retardation determination, expanding
its role from that of a mitigating circumstance to an absolute bar to the death penalty.
had an IQ of seventy-one, and a defense expert had concluded that the offender was mentally retarded, counsel
was concerned that he could not establish the deficits in his client's adaptive behavior required for the state
execution ban. He advised his client that he would risk the imposition of the death penalty if he went to trial.
The offender entered a guilty plea before the scheduled ban hearing that resulted in the imposition of two
consecutive life sentences. The federal judge found that the state court's conclusion that counsel's performance
was not constitutionally deficient did not satisfy the standards for federal collateral relief. See Warren v.
Lewis, 206 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923-24 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); cf Sanford, 25 S.W.3d at 419 (rejecting ineffective
assistance claim based on counsel failure to contend that offender's mental retardation rendered execution
unconstitutional, under heightened appellate standard due to failure to raise issue below and resultant inability
to conclusively demonstrate entitlement to statutory execution exclusion).
341. See supra notes 314-40 and infra notes 348-53 and accompanying text.
342. See Foster v. State, 525 S.E.2d 78, 79 (Ga. 2000).
343. See id. at 80-8 1.
344. See Raulerson v. State, 491 S.E.2d 791, 800 (Ga. 1997).
345. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 869 S.W.2d 719, 720-25 (Ky. 1994).
346. See Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506, 516-17 (Ind. 1999).
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When post-Atkins reviewing courts are determining whether an application error has
occurred and, if so, whether it is harmless or reversible, the determinative nature of a
mental retardation finding in terms of death sentence eligibility may cause more applica-
tion errors both to be found and to be deemed reversible.347
D. Challenges to the Adequacy of the Procedures to Determine Mental Retardation
Prior to Atkins, state appellate courts had rejected several challenges to mental re-
tardation definitions and accompanying determination procedures under their state exe-
cution bans. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected a contention that the
statutory rebuttable presumption of mental retardation should be set at an IQ level of
seventy rather than sixty-five. 348 The Tennessee Supreme Court determined that the
statute's undefined adaptive behavior component should be interpreted in its "ordinary
sense."349 The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the need for a separate mental retarda-
tion trial and upheld that state's statutory provision authorizing a determination of men-
tal retardation during the guilt phase of the trial.350 Similarly, the highest Maryland ap-
pellate court concluded that the state statute did not include a pretrial determination of
mental retardation, but rather contemplated that the trier of fact would consider the issue
after finding an offender's guilt, but before weighing the aggravating and mitigating
punishment evidence. 35 The Georgia Supreme Court upheld placing the burden of proof
regarding mental retardation on the defendant and requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.352 Finally, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld its state statute's use of the clear
and convincing evidence standard of proof regarding the mental retardation determina-
tion.353
As is abundantly clear, however, Atkins "changed the landscape of death penalty ju-
risprudence."354 Definitions and procedures that were adequate for a mental retardation
determination for purposes of a state execution ban are not necessarily adequate for the
enforcement of the Atkins constitutional execution ban. 355 As a result, several states may
find themselves facing post-Atkins challenges either to their definitional provisions or
implementing procedures or both or they may choose to proactively revise their ban
definitions or procedures to avoid potential challenges.
As noted previously, the Atkins Court gave the greatest guidance regarding the
category of mentally retarded offenders concerning whom there is a national consensus
347. See id. (finding the absence of applicable ban legislation central to finding of no reversible error).
348. See Jones v. State, 10 S.W.3d 449, 456-57 (Ark. 2000).
349. See State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 917-18 (Tenn. 1994). But see id. at 928-30, 933 (Reid, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part; dissenting regarding order denying petition to rehear) (arguing that the term
has an accepted meaning in the field and legislative history supports the AAMR definition of the term).
350. See Jenkins v. State, 498 S.E.2d 502, 509 (Ga. 1998). But see id. at 518-19 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting)
(arguing for a pretrial resolution of the issue).
351. See Richardson v. State, 630 A.2d 238, 242-44 (Md. 1993) (affirming Richardson v. State, 598 A.2d
1, 3-4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)); cf United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 351-52 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding
no plain error from trial court's determination of mental retardation, as opposed to jury determination, in
absence of express statutory direction).
352. See Jenkins, 498 S.E.2d at 513. But see id. at 516-18 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting) (arguing for a prepon-
derance of the evidence proof standard).
353. See Rogers v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1172, 1174-76 (Ind. 1998).
354. State v. Grell, 66 P.3d 1234, 1240 (Ariz. 2003).
355. See supra notes 219-34 and accompanying text (comparing procedural protections adequate to enforce
a state established affirmative defense and those required to enforce a constitutional right).
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prohibiting their execution by referencing the clinical mental retardation definitions of
the AAMR and APA.356 As one court noted, "[W]hen discussing retardation in Atkins,
the Supreme Court cited with approval psychologists' and psychiatrists' 'clinical defini-
tions of mental retardation,' and presumably expected that states will adhere to these
clinically accepted definitions when evaluating an individual's claim to be retarded.
3 57
Although most states use some variation of these clinical definitions in their state proce-
dures, a few states have adopted definitional provisions which appear narrower in scope
than those referenced by the Atkins Court. 358 For example, the Kansas and Utah defini-
tions appear to limit their state bans to a smaller subset of mentally retarded persons
than the clinical definition.359 In addition, states that use a rigid IQ cutoff score of sev-
enty for the intellectual functioning component may be excluding some individuals oth-
erwise falling within the accepted clinical definition.36 0 Although states may choose to
use a mental retardation definition that is more inclusive than that referenced in Atkins,
they risk challenge through the use of less inclusive definitions. 36'
Although the Atkins Court was not as directive regarding the elements of a constitu-
tionally sufficient procedure to identify these appropriately defined mentally retarded
offenders, the constitutional status which the Court gave to the execution exclusion re-
quires that implementing procedures must be adequate to ensure the accuracy and reli-
ability of the mental retardation determination.362 In this regard, it is likely constitution-
ally acceptable to place the burden of proof regarding mental retardation on the defen-
dant3 6 3 and to permit either the court or jury (or both) to make a mental retardation find-
ing.3 6
However, the few states which authorize a trial jury to make the only determination
of mental retardation during the guilt or punishment phase may face challenges based on
concerns about the accuracy and reliability of the determination.365 In addition, the mi-
356. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text (describing clinical definitions referenced in Atkins, as
well as Penry).
357. Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2002).
358. See supra notes 71-96 and accompanying text (describing state mental retardation definitions).
359. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4623 (1995), 76-12b01 (1997) (limiting mental retardation to signifi-
cantly subaverage general intellectual functioning "to an extent which substantially impairs one's capacity to
appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law"); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-15a-101 to -106, 77-18a-I (LEXIS through 2003 1st Sp. Sess.) (restricting adaptive func-
tioning deficiencies to those that "exist primarily in the areas of reasoning or impulse control, or in both of
these areas").
360. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 4209 (Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515A (Michie, LEXIS through
2003 Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, .135, .140 (Michie 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-
202 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.030 (West 2002).
361. For example, some states extend the developmental period to the age of twenty-two as opposed to the
age of eighteen as referenced in Atkins. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002). On the other
hand, the ban procedure enacted by New York expressly excluded mentally retarded inmates convicted of a
capital crime. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 2003). At least one state court has
recognized that this limitation cannot survive after Atkins. See People v. Smith, 753 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2002).
362. See supra note 182 (describing the importance of procedures that can achieve accuracy and reliability
in the determination of facts necessary to secure a constitutional right, especially in the capital context).
363. See supra notes 219-28, 235 and accompanying text (regarding permissible burden of proof).
364. See supra notes 157-75 and accompanying text (regarding the permissible fact finder).
365. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-654.2, 19.2-264.3:1.1 to :1.2 (Michie, LEXIS




nority of states which require a defendant to establish mental retardation by a standard
of proof higher than preponderance of the evidence 366 face possible challenge based on
the rationale of Cooper v. Oklahoma.36 7 Finally, jurisdictions with undefined or inade-
quately defined definitional and procedural provisions 368 risk equal protection or due
process challenges based on the inconsistent application and implementation of the At-
kins constitutional ban on execution. 369 Although the Atkins Court left to the states "the
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their]
execution of sentences, 370 state and federal courts remain available to determine the
constitutional appropriateness of the enforcement mechanisms selected.37'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Atkins Court clearly held that the execution of mentally retarded offenders is
constitutionally prohibited.372 In the aftermath of Atkins, however, much work to im-
plement the Court's holding remains to be done. States without statutory or judicially
established ban procedures must adopt such mechanisms.373 States that have existing
ban definitions or procedures now inadequate in light of Atkins need to revise their pro-
visions.374 Reviewing courts need to continue to interpret and ensure the appropriate
implementation of all procedures adopted.
375
In the end, the ultimate scope of the Atkins Court's holding will depend on the man-
ner in which states define mental retardation for purposes of the constitutional exclusion
and establish procedures to exclude mentally retarded offenders from execution. This
Article recommends that states adopt the 2002 AAMR definition of mental retardation
in their ban provisions, as well as adequate assessment and evaluation requirements to
implement this definition.376 It is further recommended that states adopt an implement-
ing procedure in which the trial court makes a pretrial determination of mental retarda-
tion in a proceeding in which the defendant has the burden of proof to establish his men-
366. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (West Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1.3-1101
to -1105 (West Pamp. 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 4209 (Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West
Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Harrison 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-9-I to -7 (Michie 1998);
cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002) (regarding pretrial determination only).
367. 517 U.S. 348 (1996); see supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text (describing Court's rationale for
decision).
368. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596 (West 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, .135, .140 (Michie
1999).
369. See Dowling, supra note 137, at 788-93, 802-810; Dulmen-Krantz, supra note 103, at 200-07,214-16;
Implementing Atkins, supra note 103, at 2580-81 (suggesting equal protection or due process concerns based
on inconsistency in provisions and their application within and across states).
370. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17
(1986) (plurality opinion)).
37 1. See supra notes 249-353 and accompanying text (describing judicial review proceedings).
372. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
373. As of the writing of this Article, over a year after the Atkins decision, ten of the thirty-eight capital
punishment states do not yet have statutory or judicially established procedures to identify mentally retarded
offenders and exclude them from execution: Alabama, California, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. California and Texas together account for ap-
proximately 30% of the current death row population. Collectively, these ten states hold over 45% of the
current death row population. See Death Penalty Information Center, Death Row Inmates by State, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did= 188 (last modified as of July 1, 2003).
374. See supra notes 359-61, 365-69 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 314-47 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
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tal retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.377 Finally, it is recommended that
jurisdictions also codify their post-conviction procedures in a manner that provides a
meaningful opportunity for offenders for whom no mental retardation finding for Atkins
purposes has been made to establish their ineligibility for execution and to provide
meaningful review of the issue in other cases.37' These recommended procedures appear
the most likely to accurately identify mentally retarded offenders and exclude them from
execution, thereby rendering them the most consistent with the spirit of the Atkins hold-
ing.*
377. See supra notes 203-12, 240-43 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 302-313 and accompanying text.
* Prior to the publication of this Article, two additional capital punishment states-California and South Caro-
lina-adopted procedures to implement the Atkins ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders. The
California legislation defines mental retardation as the "condition of significantly subaverage general intellec-
tual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the age of 18."
Act of Oct. 8, 2003, Stats. 2003 ch. 700, 2003 Cal. SB 3 (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376). The
state's procedure permits a capital defendant to raise the issue prior to trial and, upon the submission of an
expert declaration supporting a mental retardation finding, requires a hearing on the matter. The defendant can
request a pretrial hearing by the court to determine the issue. Otherwise, the issue is determined by the jury
after the trial's guilt phase. The defendant bears the burden of proof on the issue by a preponderance of the
evidence. See id.
The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the existing statutory definition of mental retardation in
its interim procedure: "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period." Franklin v. Maynard, Op. No.
25747, 2003 S.C. LEXIS 269, at *3 (S.C. Nov. 3, 2003). In this state's procedure, the trial court determines the
issue in a pretrial hearing in which the defendant bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. The appellate court also acknowledged Atkins' retroactive application and indicated that offenders
sentenced to death prior to Atkins can utilize existing post-conviction relief procedures to pursue Atkins claims.
In such proceedings, the offender must establish mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
at *3-6.
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